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COLLECTING A DECEDENT'S ASSETS WITHOUT
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION
Neill H. Alford, Jr.*
T HERE are two encouraging features in the current pattern
of estate management. First, formal administrations are being
avoided when they serve no special purpose; and even if a formal
administration does become necessary, the personal representative and
his advisors usually will attempt to limit the time expended and
cost incurred. Second, many states now have small estate laws. These
laws permit liquidation and distribution of certain small estates with-
out formal administration and avoid the formalities and expense of
judicial intervention. The independent executorship in Texas' reflects
this wholesome trend toward simplicity and economy in administra-
tion. In states that do not have small estate laws, lawyers and judicial
officers find other means of avoiding many administrations without
appreciable hazard to the liquidator, distributor, distributees, or pur-
chasers of the decedent's property.
Why then is a turbulent element found in this otherwise tranquil
trend of development if the decedent leaves assets in other states or
in foreign countries? Although there is no data available currently
from which the proportion of ancillary administrations to domiciliary
administrations can be estimated,' if foreign assets are involved the
tendency is to seek ancillary letters in the foreign jurisdiction.
Ancillary administration of a bank deposit of 1,500 dollars will
cost today about 150 dollars. "Chicken-feed"? Not in a 20,000 dollar
* Professor of Law, The Law School, University of Virginia. This article is based par-
tially upon a talk made by the writer during the Institute on Wills and Probate (1963)
sponsored by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, and partially upon a series of talks also
made in 1963 under the auspices of the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
Virginia State Bar. Mr. Michael W. Maupin and Mr. W. Wesley Nagle, both of the Virginia
Law Class of 1964, assisted the writer with meticulous research, and he is indebted to them.
Useful references bearing upon the collection of foreign assets without administration
are III Beale, Conflict of Laws 1444-1597 (1935); McDowell, Foreign Personal Representa-
tives 30-78, 123-169 (1957); Basye, Dispensing With Administration, 44 Mich. L. Rev.
329, 394-419 (1945); Beale, Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Administrator, 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 597 (1929); Buchanan & Myers, The Administration of Intangibles in View of First
National Bank v. Maine, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 911 (1935); Cheatham, The Statutory Successor,
the Receiver and the Executor in Conflict of Laws, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 549 (1944); Good-
rich, Problems of Foreign Administration, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 797 (1926); Hopkins, Conflict
of Laws in Administration of Decedent's Intangibles, 28 Iowa L. Rev. 422, 613 (1943);
Mersch, Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator, 18 Geo. L.J. 130 (1930); Stimson,
Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' Personal Property, 46 Va. L. Rev.
1345 (1960).
5
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 145-46 (Supp. 1963), 147-54 (1956).
A committee of the Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American
Bar Association now is making a study of foreign personal representatives. Concrete informa-
tion pertaining to the extent of ancillary administration may be produced by this group.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
estate! Also, further costs may accrue in the domicile when the assets
are remitted. Distributees, legatees, or domiciliary creditors will be
fortunate if 1,300 dollars remain. An ancillary administrator bides
his time, signs a few papers, publishes a few notices, and pays local
court costs and taxes. Claims other than tax claims seldom are filed
with an ancillary administrator unless he has been appointed on the
petition of creditors. Although little is done for the amount charged,
one can be relatively certain that local claims will be barred after
the ancillary administration is completed. Thereafter, usually the
assets are remitted to the domiciliary personal representative; but the
case is not unknown in which a domiciliary personal representative
has been confounded by a failure of the ancillary administrator to
deliver the property.3 If the local law of the foreign state permits the
domiciliary personal representative to take out ancillary letters,
judicial officers in the domicile will be thrown into a state of con-
fusion when he seeks their consent to act in the other state. If
he fails to obtain this consent, their disturbance will become dis-
tinct when he seeks credit on his domiciliary account for ancillary
activities."
In times past, the domiciliary representative could look in the other
direction, ignore the assets in the foreign state, and leave the next of
kin to their own resources to get the property from the ancillary
administrator. One could learn to live with multiple administrations.
No clear-cut fiduciary duty had developed which required him to
collect assets outside the state of his appointment.! However, this
situation exists no longer. The domiciliary personal representative
now is liable for the full federal estate tax on land and personal
3 E.g., In re Lane's Estate, 199 Iowa 520, 202 N.W. 244 (1925); In re De Lano's Estate,
181 Kan. 729, 315 P.2d 611 (1957); In re Estate of Robinson, 25 Misc. 2d 9, 206
N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Horwich's Estate, 11 Misc.2d 79, 170 N.Y.S.2d 472
(Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Estate of McNeel, 10 Misc. 2d 359, 170 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Surr. Ct.
1957); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Administration of Intangibles in Light of the De Lano
Decision, 6 Kan. L. Rev. 439 (1958); 12 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 219 (1934); 25 Mod. L. Rev.
468 (1962); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1043 (1934).
'A domiciliary personal representative often will serve as ancillary representative if a
nonresident is eligible for the ancillary appointment. Pains should be taken to clear ancillary
expenses on the ancillary account. Travel expenses to and from the ancillary jurisdiction
usually are approved in the domiciliary account. But see Kyle v. Ribelin, 188 Ark. 264, 65
S.W.2d 46 (1933); Jones v. Jones, 39 S.C. 247, 17 S.E. 587 (1893); 18 Minn. L. Rev. 601
(1934).
In Tennessee, for example, which adhered to the strict theory of territorial jurisdiction,
the personal representative was not expected to operate outside the state of his appointment.
Bowman v. Carr, 5 Lea 571 (Tenn. 1880). If the personal representative had written evi-
dence of the debt in his possession, he might be expected to collect it in another state. Klein
v. French, 57 Miss. 662 (1880). For modern cases dealing with the duty to collect foreign
assets, see In re Brown's Estate, 28 Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.2d 387 (Orphan's Ct. 1944); Welsh
v. Welsh, 136 W.Va. 914, 69 S.E.2d 34 (1952).
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property no matter where the assets are located.' He has to be
familiar with this property in order to pay the tax, and he must
know enough about the business of the decedent in other states to
file his income tax returns and to determine his gift tax liability.
Pressure probably will be brought to bear upon the personal repre-
sentative to develop liquid assets in order to pay taxes and other
estate obligations. These forces compel the domiciliary personal rep-
resentative to discover and to recover any foreign assets that he can.
State taxes also present a problem in reducing the overall tax
impact upon the estate. States of both "domicile" and "business" situs
may impose inheritance taxes upon intangible personal property.!
Tangibles are taxable where situated.! To avoid multiple taxation,
the domiciliary personal representative usually is pushed to recover
as much of the personal estate of the decedent as he can legitimately
without subjecting it to crippling local tax blows. If an ancillary
administration is commenced, it is assured that local taxes will be
imposed upon the property.
Since good and sufficient reasons exist to cut ancillary adminis-
tration to the bare minimum, it is disconcerting that so many an-
cillary administrations apparently are conducted. In the writer's
opinion, many domiciliary personal representatives blunder into an-
cillary administrations through ignorance, although many judicial
officers have been known to give kindly guidance to the wayward.'
Some of the administrations arise through references to lawyers to
collect foreign assets. For example, the local practitioner who is to
collect debts without exact knowledge of the existence of local credi-
tors may be inclined to seek ancillary letters for his own protection.
a Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2002; Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1958); Alexander, Personal
Liability of Executors and Trustees for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 9 Tax L.
Rev. 1 (1953).
'Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
The situs of intangibles may be divided for death taxes. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316
U.S. 174 (1942); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); People v. Cooke, 370 P.2d
896 (Colo. 1962); Marsh, Multiple Death Taxation in the United States, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 69 (1961); Comment, State Inheritance Taxes Interstate Confliction, Confusion, Con-
formity, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 106 (1958); Comment, How Far Will Multi-State Death Taxation
Go? I Vand. L. Rev. 93 (1947); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 393 (1930).
'Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925). United States bonds, certificates, and
savings accounts are intangible personalty. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928). Cur-
rency owned by a Virginia decedent in a safe deposit box in another state is tangible per-
sonalty and is taxable only where situated. Thomas v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 443 (1960), noted
in 46 Minn. L. Rev. 393 (1961).
' The writer is indebted to Senator William Spong of Portsmouth, Virginia, for the in-
cident of the North Carolina domiciliary personal representative who wrote Judge Brock-
enbrough Lamb of the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, inquiring how
movable property located in Virginia might be removed to North Carolina. The Judge told
him to "send a moving van."
1964]
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Also, corporate fiduciaries may seek to avoid conflicts with their pro-
fessional competitors in other states.
Some ancillary administrations clearly may be necessary. Perhaps
title to foreign land must be cleared by elimination of creditor claims
in the situs jurisdiction. A debtor may refuse to pay without a receipt
from a local administrator. The biography of the decedent may be so
obscure that neither his assets nor his debts in other states can be
discovered with certainty without a formal administration. Also it
is an unfortunate fact that some domiciliary fiduciaries lack the
competence to be permitted to collect debts and to pay creditors
without the supervision a judicial officer in a foreign state can provide.
Assuming the situation is favorable to the collection of foreign
assets without an ancillary administration, under what special con-
ditions can recoveries of foreign assets be executed with safety to
the domiciliary personal representative and those who deal with him?
What viable policies, if any, support ancillary administrations today?
By what techniques can a domiciliary personal representative recover
foreign personalty in a manner compatible with any of these policies
that do exist? What new situations are developing which may present
special problems in avoiding ancillary administration? This Article
attempts to answer each of those questions.
I. BACKGROUND OF MULTIPLE ADMINISTRATION
The practice of ancillary administration is founded upon vague
but deeply rooted principles left as debris from the battle for juris-
diction between the common law and ecclesiastical courts in Tudor
and Stuart England. These principles have retained vitality in the
confusion in legal administration incident to a federal system of
government in the United States.
The particular phase of the far-flung battle between the common
lawyers and the civilians pertinent here is the effort, particularly by
the Exchequer bar, to undermine supervision of the ecclesiastical
courts over the administration of estates. The Bishop or his represen-
tative in the court of ordinary handled most of the problems in
estate administration. However, competitive tension and potential
for administrative schism existed between the two ecclesiastical
Provinces of York and Canterbury. The policy of the lawyers was
one of "divide and conquer." Set the Province of Canterbury against
the Province of York; then, when the stalemate is complete and
administrations have boged down, "move in and grab the loot." Quite
justly, when the stalemate occurred, the loot fell to the Chancery
[Vol. 18
COLLECTING A DECEDENT'S ASSETS
Court rather than to the votaries of the common law; but, never-
theless, the debris of the battle still impedes and embarrasses us.
In Byron v. Byron in 1596," Chief Justice Anderson had before
him the case of a domiciliary administrator in the Province of York
who had released the debt of a debtor domiciled in the Province of
Canterbury. After collection of the debt, a court of the Province
of Canterbury had issued letters to an ancillary administrator, who
then sued the debtor for a second payment. The debtor pleaded in
bar the release of the domiciliary administrator. Anderson held the
release ineffective. If there were assets in both provinces, Canterbury,
he reasoned, as senior province, should have issued the letters of
administration. Also, the situs for administration was Canterbury,
the residence of the debtor. Anderson remarked that two administra-
tions in the same estate were res inaudita.
Although Anderson may never have heard of two administra-
tions for one estate, multiple courts dealing with a single case, and
each taxing their costs, had been a source of grievance to common
Englishmen subject to the common law for generations. Writing
more than two centuries before Byron v. Byron," William Langland
had Piers Plowman lament the expense of, and the number of courts
dealing with, a single case." No doubt this chirping, like that of a
disgruntled cricket hidden in a cold and humble hearth, failed to
reach the ears of the great and powerful. In any event, it would have
made little difference if it had. In Langland's time, ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over the administration of estates was securely beyond
the influence both of secular reform and of secular avarice. But
matters had altered by the time of Anderson. The ecclesiastical courts,
when dealing with personal property, which had become an important
element of wealth in an age of colonization, were being drawn
rapidly under secular control. The judges in the ecclesiastical courts
more often were laymen than churchmen, and the procedures of the
courts of ordinary were scrutinized closely by the common law
judges.
After the decision in Byron v. Byron," the lawyers practicing
before the common law courts mounted such a savage attack upon
ecclesiastical jurisdiction that the Court of Exchequer was persuaded
to rule that if assets above a specified amount were in both York
'0 2 Cro. Eliz. 472, 78 Eng. Rep. 709 (Q.B. 1596). A collection of earlier cases involving
dual administration may be found in Buchanan & Myers, The Administration of Intangibles
in View of First National Bank v. Maine, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 911, 911-12 (1935).
" Supra note 10.
"Langland, Vision of Piers Plowman (Circa 1350) lines 447-448, Passus III (Wells ed.
1935).
" 2 Cro. Eliz. 472, 78 Eng. Rep. 709 (Q.B. 1596).
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and Canterbury, there must be two administrations for the one
decedent. Undiscovered assets, often still a concomitant of multiple
administrations, could be sought by a bill of discovery in Exchequer.14
Later English cases expanded this position. By 1700, three postulates
relating to the administration of estates had been implanted firmly in
the English law: (1) Jurisdiction in administration is territorial and
does not turn principally upon the personal law of the decedent; (2)
the authority of the personal representative is limited to this territory,
like the authority of a sheriff to his shire; (3) the situs of assets within
the territory determines which personal representative should admin-
ister them.
With a few exceptions, the American courts did not follow this
precedent blindly. The American courts, however, were influenced
by the English doctrine. The shell of the common law concept of
territorial jurisdiction was retained, local meaning was worked into
the shell by the legislatures and the courts, and a plethora of compli-
cated embroidery was added by the doctrines of conflict of laws
developed for federal purposes.
The authority of a personal representative appointed within a state
was said to be limited to the territory of that state."5 But if this per-
sonal representative, whether executor or administrator, was qualified
or appointed in the domicile of the decedent, by comity (a growing
point of law) his administrative title or right to possession for admin-
istrative purposes was said to extend to movable assets wherever
found, subject to being divested when found in another state by
appointment there of an ancillary administrator." A few states-
Missouri," Vermont, " Tennessee" and perhaps New Hampshire-
adhered to the strict territorial view.
Although comity was invoked to circumvent territorial limita-
tions and to permit the domiciliary personal representative for com-
"Allison & Sharpley v. Dickenson, Hard. 216, 145 Eng. Rep. 460 (Ex. 1661). In
Price v. Simpson, 2 Cro. Eliz. 718, 78 Eng. Rep. 953 (C.P. 1599), it was held that two
administrations were necessary if property was found in a "peculiar" (an ecclesiastical
franchise jurisdiction) within a province.
"Although the executor derives part of his authority from nomination by the testator,
both the executor and administrator derive authority from the court which qualifies or
appoints them. In re Ferris' Estate, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W.2d 889 (1944); Hargrave v.
Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 285, 193 So. 648 (1940).
1 This doctrine has not been extended at common law to the power to sue in a foreign
state, although suits have been allowed by comity under special circumstances. Kirkbridge
v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852 (1937), noted in 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 247
(1937); In re Chisholm's Will, 108 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Cheatham, The Statu-
tory Successor, the Receiver and the Executor in Conflict of Laws, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 549
(1944).
"Crohn v. Clay County Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, 118 S.W. 498 (1909).
"&Vaughn v. Barrett, 5 Vt. 333 (1833).
"Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed 55 (Tenn. 1855).
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mercial convenience to recover assets in another state, new con-
fusion was generated by the complicated and obscure doctrines of
conflict of laws. Not the least of the problems which became more
complex was the situs of assets for administration. Equating situs
with jurisdiction, the states agreed that the state in which land was
located had jurisdiction over it for taxation, succession, and adminis-
tration unless superseded by the federal government acting within
its constitutional powers. This gave little comfort to the foreign
personal representative who seldom had possession of the land for
administration. Furthermore, the federal government, for admin-
istrative convenience, abandoned the state situs rule pertaining to
land for the estate tax. The domiciliary personal representative paid
the federal tax on the land no matter where it was located."m
The states tended to diverge in the situs rules they formulated for
the personal estate. Commercial or administrative convenience grad-
ually eroded older situs concepts. Demands for state revenue led to
special situs rules for local taxation. The states, each travelling at
its own speed and in its own direction, finally could be found at
various points along the spectrum of possible situs formulae. The
simple debt first was said to have a situs for administration where
the debtor resided. 1 This situs concept later was extended to any
place at which the debtor could be sued." Some states adhered to
the older view; some followed the newer. As corporate wealth became
important, the older view that shares of stock had their situs at the
domicile of the corporation began to yield to the idea that the place
at which the certificates were found determined their situs. Some
courts held that the domicile of the owner controlled administration
of the shares. 3 Movables, such as chairs, vehicles, and specialty paper,
were said, rather unimaginatively, to have a situs where found. It
is not clear from the decisions whether the courts meant found only
at the death of the decedent or found at any time after his death.'
The latter position appears to have been taken in practice. A "shell
game" could be played in each estate, with property moved from
state to state after the death of the decedent until a personal repre-
20 See note 6 supra.
2' Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
2
2Fox v. Carr, 16 Hun 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1879).
2Miller's Estate v. Executrix of Miller's Estate, 90 Kan. 819, 136 Pac. 255 (1913).
See Russell v. Hooker, 67 Conn. 24, 34 Atl. 711 (1895); In re Nichol's Estate, 24 Pa.
D. & C.2d 247 (Pa. 1961); Goodrich, Problems of Foreign Administration, 39 Harv. L. Rev.
797, 805-07 (1926).
24See In re Estate of Bobes, 15 Misc. 2d 530, 182 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Surr. Ct. 1958);
Goodrich, Problems of Foreign Administration, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 797, 798-801 (1926);
Stimson, Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' Personal Property, 46 Va.
L. Rev. 1345, 1358-60 (1960).
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sentative took possession of it in one of the states for administration.
Moreover, difficulty, of course, arose concerning the characteristics
of property relevant to the situs test. What are "movables" and what
are "immovables"? Are bonds, negotiable instruments, and shares of
stock "tangibles" or "intangibles"? There have been differences of
opinion concerning these matters."
The catastrophic development befalling the administration of
estates in the United States, however, was the policy that each state
could determine the domicile of the owner for assets within its
jurisdiction."s The "personal" law of the decedent, based on domicile,
could determine succession to his personal estate, the place for its
administration, and its taxation. If each state could make a determi-
nation of domicile, multiple successions, multiple administrations,
and multiple taxes were the probable consequence. The possibility
of multiple determinations of domicile hung like a malign albatross
over the tax planning and administration of every estate.
Professor Ehrenzweig, commenting upon conflict of laws doctrines
pertaining to succession, has noted the illusion of certainty and sta-
bility in this area that is created by the literature on this subject."
Professor Beale's treatment of administration of estates in his great
treatise on conflict of laws,28 for example, conveys this illusion and
perhaps has done more to cultivate a favorable opinion of ancillary
administrations among lawyers than any other legal writing in the
present century. Actually, the conflict of laws doctrine relating to
administration of estates is in chaos. If a personal representative by
avoiding ancillary administration can avoid an unnecessary judicial
intervention in the administration of the estate, he also can avoid
the uncertainties of the conflict of laws doctrines pertaining to
administration, succession, and perhaps even taxation. This is as
strong an argument as any for avoiding ancillary administrations
whenever it is legally and ethically possible to do so.
II. CASE OF A HYPOTHETICAL DECEDENT
Assume you have just been appointed administrator in Virginia
of the estate of Colonel Hobart Jones, USA. Virginia creditors urged
the appointment. Colonel Jones died, we think, while domiciled
in Virginia. We know he was killed in a two-car collision near Pine-
25See III Beale, Conflict of Laws 1476-1501 (1935).
"Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S.
214 (1900).
27 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 654 (1962).
28III Beale, op. cit. supra note 25 at 1441-1568 (1935). Although Professor Beale is no
advocate of ancillary administrations, he does appear to regard these as the norm if multi-
state assets are involved. His influence upon the Bar has been enormous.
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hurst, North Carolina, where he had been on leave playing golf. The
other driver probably was at fault. The Colonel's estranged, but not
legally separated, wife lives with her mother in New York City. His
two minor sons are in school in Virginia.
After inquiry, we have discovered possible assets in the Colonel's
estate as follows:
1. Although stationed at Bremerhaven, Germany, the Colonel
maintained an apartment at Groningen, Holland. He used the apart-
ment as a place to enjoy coin and book collecting during his leisure
hours. About 8,000 dollars in European gold coins are believed to
be in a safe in the apartment with an unknown value in rare books.
He is known to have some property at his military station in Bremer-
haven-probably a small amount of cash and some personal items.
2. In New York he owns a completely furnished summer home on
Long Island. The home is believed to have a safe in the basement con-
taining heirloom jewelry. New York banks have 17,000 dollars on
deposit in the Colonel's name. The trust officer of one of the banks,
as custodian, holds stock certificates in a Texas corporation and bearer
bonds for the Colonel.
3. In Texas the Colonel owned land subject to a gas lease and has
accrued royalties. There are also unaccrued royalties and delay rentals
under "drill or pay" type clauses in leases upon other land in Texas.
4. We are fairly certain that the Colonel has back pay due from
the Army.
5. Upon his arrival at Pinehurst, the Colonel rented a safe deposit
box in the Tarheel Bank. The North Carolina State Police have the
key which was picked up at the scene of the wreck. We do not know
the contents of this box.
How much of this property are you likely to collect without
ancillary administration? How will you go about getting hold of
the property in Holland? Can you sue under the North Carolina
Death by Wrongful Act Statute without ancillary letters? How
should you go about getting a look in that safe deposit box in Pine-
hurst? Quite obviously, there does not seem to have been any estate
planning for the Colonel. Let us consider, first how we should go
about collecting property in the United States. Then we will tackle
collection of the property overseas.
III. COLLECTION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY AND DEBTS IN NEW YORK
The most frequent policy justification for ancillary administra-
tion is protection of local creditors. There is something to be said for
this position if limited to the tax creditor. After the local estate is
1964]
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disclosed and inventoried, the decedent's contacts with the state can
be exposed and examined to determine the tax liability. The tax
claim then can be satisfied before the property is removed beyond
the reach of the local tax commissioner."
With respect to other creditors, the current importance of ancillary
administration is doubtful. Unlike the claims of the foreign tax com-
missioner, the claims for goods, services, and money furnished the
decedent probably will be respected in the domicile. It is possible these
creditors might not hear of the decedent's death? This is unlikely in
an age of installment buying and credit cards, in which a creditor
has become more of an economic partner than an antagonist. Credit
insurance-including life insurance upon the lives of debtors-is
carried by many creditors who have numerous debtors and has re-
duced greatly pressure by creditors upon the foreign assets in an
estate.
Professor Beale believed he detected in cases involving ancillary
administration a "creditor prejudice" rule which might be raised when
a debtor paid a foreign domiciliary representative who had taken no
ancillary letters and when the debtor was ignorant of the existence
of local creditors." Professor Beale probably developed this idea from
Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson,l in which a court, purporting to follow
the United States Supreme Court case of Wilkins v. Ellett,2 required
a South Carolina bank which had paid a deposit to a Georgia ancillary
administrator to pay a second time to a South Carolina domiciliary
administrator c.t.a. It was not clear from the record at trial whether
or not there were South Carolina creditors at the time of initial pay-
ment. Of course, it can be argued that a debtor who pays a foreign
ancillary administrator should have a special duty to inquire con-
cerning local creditors. In Wilkins v. Ellett," however, a debtor was
protected who paid a foreign ancillary administrator, although the
29 Absent interstate agreements, no state enforces the revenue laws of another unless
exceptions are made based on comity. III Beale, op. cit. supra note 25 at 1625-38 (1935);
Annot., 78 A.L.R. 575 (1932). Non-tax creditors usually can reach the property in the
domicile of decedent. E.g., Potter v. First Nat'l Bank, 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 151 Atl. 546 (Ch.
1930). Local debtors and bailees sometimes are said to need protection, and thus an ancillary
administration should be required. Their payment, however, is voluntary and they should
be able to assess the facts. Concern also is expressed from time to time that a foreign per-
sonal representative, unless supervised locally, may fail to pick up collections in his domi-
ciliary account. See In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 366, 108 P.2d 391 (1940). Restless and
suspicious distributees, legatees, and creditors place a heavy practical burden upon the
personal representative to account for assets collected in foreign states.
2 Beale, Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Administrator, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 604-09
(1929); Mersch, Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator, 18 Geo. L.J. 130, 139-48
(1930).
3' 123 S.C. 208, 116 S.E. 451 (1923).
a2 10 8 U.S. 256 (1883).
3 Ibid.
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court emphasized that there were no creditors where the debtor
resided. Courts generally have followed this decision, but there can
be no assurance that a debtor always will be protected under these
circumstances." If the debtor went into the jurisdiction in which the
ancillary administrator had been appointed and paid the debt, there
would seem no chance of a second recovery since the debt would then
be a domestic asset in the foreign jurisdiction. Wilkins v. Ellett5 and
its progeny, involving payments to foreign ancillary personal repre-
sentatives, do not appear to form a sufficient basis for generalizations
about a creditor prejudice rule if the payment is made to a foreign
domiciliary personal representative.
As mentioned previously,"5 a few states have followed a strict ter-
ritorial view at common law concerning the authority of a personal
representative, although this position to some degree seems modified
by statute in all of these states. 7 There are early cases in these states
which imposed double liability. Other states have statutes dealing
with collections of debts or goods by foreign personal representatives
which the debtor should comply with before making payment.s With
" The demand for a single or unified administration is frequently echoed in decisions
concerning a foreign ancillary administrator's collections. The ancillary administrator lacks
the argument of extraterritorial power which an executor can make based upon the ex-
istence of a will. The concept of a "universal successor" also can be argued by the executor
to sustain his collections.
' 108 U.S. 256 (1883).
36 See notes 17-19 supra.
"
7 Mo. Ann. Stat. §5 456.240 - 456.350 (Supp. 1963) (Uniform Fiduciaries Act); Tenn.
Code Ann. §5 35-201 - 35-214 (1955) (Uniform Fiduciaries Act), § 35-901 - 35-911
(Supp. 1964) (Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers). Vermont
has only the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which, as subsequently indicated in this article,
see text accompanying notes 49-51 supra, may facilitate stock transfers by fiduciaries. Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 301-22 (1958).
aSE.g., Ferguson v. Morris, 67 Ala. 389 (1880). See Ala. Code tit. 61, § 141, 151
(1960); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-710 (1956) (confined to release of mortgage); Cal.
Civ. Code § 2939Y2 (confined to release of mortgage); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 49-12
(1958); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 654.04 (1944), 734.30(3) (1964); Ga. Code Ann. § 113-2406
(1959); Idaho Code Ann. § 15-813 (1948) (limited to discharge of mortgage); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 3, § 266 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-751 (1953); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 633.53 (1950) (limited to release of judgment and mortgage lien); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 59-1707 (1949); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 154, § 89 (1954); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
204, 5 3 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 291.19 (1962), 525.273 (1947); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 622 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 473.667 (1956) (six-month waiting period); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 554:28, 554:29 (1955) (licensing by court and waiting period); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 31-16-9 (1953) (payment of tax), § 31-16-10 (1953) (notice to tax commission-
er); N.D. Cent. Code § 35-01-25 (1960) (limited to release of mortgage); Okla. Star.
Ann. tit. 58, § 262 (1937) (limited to release of mortgage); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 116.186
(1963) (if over $500, ninety-day waiting period and publication requirement); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 20, § 320.1101 (1950); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-18-24, 33-18-26 (1956);
S.C. Code Ann. § 19-600 (1962); S.D. Code § 35.0801 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 30-1631 (1955); Va. Code Ann. § 64-123 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.11 (1957),
235.56 (1957), 287.16 (1958), 316.30 (1958); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-34 (1959). Com-
pliance with the statutory provisions will protect the debtor against a second payment.
Carbondale Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 66 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ill. 1946). Several states have
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these exceptions, however, all of the reported cases protect the
bailee, custodian, or debtor against a second recovery if (1) no
local letters have been issued and (2) the bailee, custodian, or debtor
has no actual notice of local creditors. 9
In states lacking large commercial centers, a troublesome problem
may arise concerning the precise quantum of notice necessary to result
in double liability. In Maas v. German Say. Bank," a leading New York
case, a New York bank paid a deposit to a New Jersey domiciliary per-
sonal representative five months after ancillary letters issued in New
York. The debtor had no actual notice of these letters, and the New
York ancillary administrator had not taken any action since his ap-
pointment. Mere recordation of the ancillary letters in the surrogate
court was held insufficient constructive notice. A double recovery was
not permitted because the bank lacked actual notice of the letters or
of the existence of creditors. Regarding the quantum of notice neces-
sary, the Maas rule probably is a fair reflection of the trend in large
commercial centers in which the determination of all creditors in any
event will be an extremely difficult matter. However, more stringent
requirements of inquiry may be imposed upon debtors in communi-
ties in which the letters or creditors may be discovered easily. But
even in those communities the chance is remote that a debtor will
be made to pay twice if (1) he accepts the written word of a foreign
domiciliary personal representative that all debts are paid, (2) utilizes
the sources of information readily available to him-such as news
files-and (3) then pays without actual notice of creditors. On the
other hand, it is likely that he will have to pay twice if (1) ancillary
letters actually have issued and (2) the ancillary administrator has
commenced his administration by publication of notices. Of course,
a debtor also will be protected against an ancillary administrator
appointed after payment was made.
statutes setting forth substantially the common law rule. N.J. Stat. Ann. 5 3A:13-1 (1953);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2129.03 (Page 1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.1105 (1950);
R.I. Gem. Laws Ann. § 33-18-25 (1956). See Annot., 10 A.L.R. 272 (1921).
39 Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256 (1883); Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 370 (1878);
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Sharp, 53 Md. 521 (1879); Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 117
N.Y. 125, 22 N.E. 572 (1889). See McCully v. Cooper, 114 Cal. 258, 46 Pac. 82 (1896);
Gardiner v. Thorndike, 183 Mass. 81, 66 N.E. 633 (1903). Cf. In re Estate of Tripp, 29
Misc. 2d 153, 216 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Surr. Ct. 1961) (petition for ancillary letters refused
after foreign domiciliary personal representative had collected only asset); Valentine v.
Duke, 128 Wash. 128, 222 Pac. 494 (1924) (Alaska bound by agreement to allow Wash-
ington bank to convert assets and place in savings account). In Volpe v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 277 App. Div. 543, 101 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1950), a bank which paid a foreign
guardian was not required to pay a second time in an action by the ward. See In re
Starr's Trust, 14 Misc. 2d 1, 178 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1958); In re Kiessling's Trust,
11 Misc. 2d 660, 174 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Annot., 10 A.L.R. 276 (1921).
40 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903).
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Morrison v. Hass" is one of the leading cases concerning the collec-
tion of movable property when no ancillary administrator has been
appointed and all known creditors (except the tax collector) have
been paid. In this case testatrix died in Massachusetts, leaving mova-
bles in Massachusetts and in New York. Her son probated her will in
New York, received letters testamentary there, and paid all known
creditors both in New York and in Massachusetts. All assets in
Massachusetts were removed to New York by 1911. In 1914 the
Massachusetts tax commissioner attempted to secure payment of an
inheritance tax by securing appointment of a Massachusetts admin-
istrator. The Massachusetts administrator sued for conversion the
New York executor and others who had assisted him in removing
the Massachusetts assets. Although the parties to this suit agreed
that decedent had been domiciled in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts
court by comity respected the New York decision allowing pri-
mary probate there. The record did not disclose whether the New
York court had found New York domicile, but apparently the
Massachusetts court also was prepared to respect this finding on
the basis of comity. The court stated that at "common law" the
executor's right to possession extended to "goods or credits of the
estate in this State with the consent of the party having possession,
provided he did not have to invoke the aid of the courts of this
jurisdiction-especially as there were no local creditors of the de-
ceased. . . ."" By emphasizing the comity element, the extra-territorial
power of the foreign domiciliary executor is reconciled with the
British postulate of a territorial limitation upon his powers.
No hard and fast distinction has been made between a domiciliary
executor and a domiciliary administrator in applying an "administra-
tive title" or "possession" theory based on comity. The "universality
doctrine"-regarding the executor as universal successor of the dece-
dent, but the administrator as a mere court appointee-might be a
sufficient ground for a distinction between their extraterritorial
powers.43 However, no such distinction seems to have been made by
41 229 Mass. 514, 118 N.E. 893 (1918). In a companion case, Morrison v. Berkshire
Loan & Trust Co., 229 Mass. 519, 118 N.E. 895 (1918), the administrator brought a con-
tract action against a bank which had paid an amount deposited by the decedent to the
New York executor. A Massachusetts statute, designed to implement the collection of
revenue, imposed liability for the inheritance tax upon a person or corporation delivering
assets belonging to the estate of a non-resident decedent before the tax was paid. The action
for the tax was to be brought by the terms of the statute by the Treasurer and Receiver
General or his representative. Exceptions to a ruling in favor of the defendant were over-
ruled, since the administrator brought the action and not the Treasurer and Receiver Gen-
eral and also because there was no mention of any inheritance tax liability in the record.
S"'Morrison v. Hass, 118 N.E. at 894.
43 See III Beale, op. cit. supra note 25 at 1467-69 (1935).
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the courts. For example, in Swan v. Bill " the New Hampshire Court
applied the Morrison principle45 to a Massachusetts domiciliary ad-
ministratrix who took possession of a leasehold in New Hampshire.
The Morrison principle" may be based simply upon recognition
that the situs of movables for administration can change after the
decedent's death. No matter who brings the assets into the domiciliary
jurisdiction the result should be the same if the domiciliary personal
representative takes possession. Movables move whether the quondam
owner dies or not. Courts have adjusted to this rule of commercial
convenience, and will intervene only if a local personal representa-
tive has been appointed before the property is removed or if a fraud
upon creditors who are known or should have been known to the
debtor would be committed by its removal.
Special circumstances exist if the debt is represented by specialty
paper. In that event a debtor must exercise sufficient prudence to
obtain the promissory note or other document from the domiciliary
personal representative. Strangely, problems have arisen in this con-
text even among New Englanders, who by general repute exercise
great prudence in these matters. In Amsden v. Danielson,"' for ex-
ample, a Connecticut debtor paid a specialty debt to a Connecticut
ancillary administrator although he knew that a domiciliary executor
in Rhode Island held the note. The debtor owned land in Rhode
Island against which the Rhode Island executor thereafter quite easily
obtained a judgment. If specialty paper is obtained and destroyed,
there will be no double recovery from the debtor, regardless of
whether an ancillary administrator has been appointed locally or
whether local creditors exist.
Corporate stock has presented special difficulties in administration.
Of course, the person who holds the share certificates can have them
administered in the jurisdiction in which they are situated. Admin-
istration of the share certificates, however, does not mean the corpora-
tion or its transfer agent will transfer ownership or issue new share
certificates. The corporation may insist upon an administration in
the domicile of the corporation of the economic right which the
certificates represent. With multiple findings of domicile possible,
the corporation may be faced with claims by two "domiciliary" per-
sonal representatives. One of the older cases illustrating the latter
difficulty is Coca-Cola Int'l Corp. v. New York Trust Co.4' In this
"95 N.H. 158, 59 A.2d 346 (1948).
"See text following note 41 supra and accompanying note 42 supra.
Ibid.
47 19 R.I. 533, 35 Atl. 70 (1896).
4'22 Del. Ch. 344, 2 A.2d 290 (Ch. 1938), aff'd sub nom., Riley'v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
[Vol. 18
COLLECTING A DECEDENT'S ASSETS
case Georgia domiciliary executors had possession of share certificates
in a Delaware corporation. There was also a finding of domicile by
a New York court. The New York administrator demanded the
issuance of new shares to it as corporate fiduciary. The Delaware
corporation interpleaded the contestants in Delaware, and the Chan-
cellor there made his own finding of domicile in New York, which
he could do since the economic right represented by the certificates
had its situs in Dalaware.
Under the now generally adopted Uniform Stock Transfer Act,"
transfer of the certificates is the key to title. The Act does not change
the "situs rules" as such. But if the foreign personal representative
obtains possession of the certificates and is prepared to surrender
them to the company, the company will be amply safe in trans-
ferring ownership on its books and issuing new shares without ancil-
lary administration or an adjudication in its domicile. The situation
is much the same as if the company were called upon to pay a
specialty debt by a foreign personal representative prepared to sur-
render the specialty paper.
Although the Uniform Stock Transfer Act will not preclude
ancillary administrations at the domicile of the corporation, the Act
does facilitate voluntary transfers of ownership by eliminating the
problem presented in Coca-Cola0 of a corporate decision among
multiple claimants. Apprehension has existed under the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act that a corporation nevertheless might be liable
to an ancillary administrator appointed in the corporate domicile.
The writer believes that this uncertainty has stemmed from miscon-
ceptions of the general common law rule imposing double liability
upon bailees, custodians, and debtors. 1 However, the Uniform Act
for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers" appears to elimi-
nate such hazards if reasonable precaution is exercised by the corpora-
tion and its transfer agent. The Uniform Act for Simplification of
Fiduciary Security Transfers" simplifies the documentation required
to register a security in the name of a fiduciary or to transfer a
security assigned by a fiduciary. The executor or administrator need
have only a court or clerk's certificate of qualification or appoint-
ment dated within sixty days of the change on the books of the
496 ULA 1.
"0 Coca-Cola Int'l Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 22 Del. Ch. 344, 2 A.2d 290 (Ch.
1938), aff'd sub nom., Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). See text fol-
lowing note 48 supra.
1III Beale, op. cit. supra note 25 at 1501-03 (1935); Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1092
(1956).




corporation in the registered ownership of the security."' A person
asserting a claim of beneficial interest adverse to such a change must
give the corporation or transfer agent written notice before the
change is made."5 The corporation or its transfer agent can incur
no liability by acting in accordance with the Act.
With these legal features concerning movables in mind, the first
problem in dealing with the New York movables in the Colonel's
estate " will be to dissuade the widow from attempting an ancillary
administration. There is a chance she might challenge a Virginia
finding of domicile. Furthermore, the fact that there appear to be
no assets physically in Virginia-unless property held by the minor
sons or deposited for their school expenses might be argued as local
assets-may produce embarrassment if Virginia letters of administra-
tion are based solely upon decedent's domicile in the state. 7 Assuming
the widow can be persuaded to agree to the Virginia administration,
we can proceed safely with the collection of New York assets.
Since there is no money to pay New York creditors unless we can
collect some or all of the bank deposits, these funds must be obtained
first. The banks probably will give the administrator possession of
the funds on deposit (unless they are Totten trust deposits 8), and
the trust officer probably will deliver the stock certificates and bonds
if certain requirements are met: (1) production of a tax waiver from
New York tax authorities; (2) delivery of authenticated copies of
the Virginia letters of administration, showing domicile of the dece-
dent in Virginia and bonding of the personal representative; (3) an
affidavit that no creditors exist in New York or that all will be paid
and that ancillary letters have not issued; (4) an agreement in
writing to exonerate the bank and custodian from liability in the
event of a second recovery.
After receiving the share certificates, the personal representative
should be able to transfer ownership or have his name registered as
owner by the Texas corporation, since Texas has adopted the Uniform
5 Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers § 4.
5 Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers § 5. As to voting
of stock by foreign personal representative, see Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1082 (1955).
56 See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.
"III Beale, op. cit. supra note 25 at 1449-50. Cf. Stimson, supra note 24 at 1350-53
(advocating abandonment of domicile test and general adoption of situs standard).
" Under the New York Totten trust theory, a bank deposit with the depositor indicated
as trustee for a designated beneficiary creates a trust of the residue in the account at the
depositor's death. The New York banks will pay this amount only to the beneficiary named.
The transactions have been sustained in a number of New York cases. In re Totten, 179
N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) 70 L.R.A. 711 (191S); In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33,
100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
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Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers."9 Neverthe-
less, the personal representative will have to secure a guarantee of
his signature by an officer of a bank which is a member of the
Federal Reserve System or an officer of a banking corporation
organized and existing under Texas law."0 The terms upon which this
guarantee is furnished will depend upon the rules of the guaranteeing
bank. There will be no difficulty in transferring the bearer bonds
if the transfer is necessary in order to raise cash.
If the administrator so wishes, he should be able to remove the
furniture and jewelry from the summer home without ancillary
letters, although to do so he will have to persuade the custodian, if
any, to release the property. If he wishes, the administrator can make
a bill of sale for the property and remove the cash proceeds to
Virginia.
IV. THE DOMICILIARY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND
INTERESTS IN LAND IN OTHER STATES
A personal representative's sole source of authority over land is a
local statute at the situs thereof. In the absence of such a statute,
the personal representative has no power. Although by the common
law rule title to land passes directly to the heir or devisee, a personal
representative may have to take possession of land to discharge debts.
However, a foreign personal representative cannot act to acquire
possession unless he is given this power by the law of the state of
situs.e
There is only one exception at common law to this general rule.
If a foreign domiciliary executor has conferred upon him by the
will the power to sell land, he can exercise this power without local
qualification if he probates the will locally."2 Probate of the will
usually will be required before the will can be recorded. Some
statutes, however, permit the will to be recorded as a muniment of
title without probate. 3 If an ancillary administration is conducted,
5 Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 582-1 (Supp. 1963). See text accompanying notes
52-56 supra.6 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 582-1 § 3a (Supp. 1963).
:IClarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
6 2 Bacharach v. Spriggs, 173 Ark. 250, 292 S.W. 150 (1927); McMillen v. Bliley, 115
Colo. 575, 177 P.2d 547 (1946); Plenderleith v. Edwards, 328 Ill. 431, 159 N.E. 780
(1928); Niquette v. Green, 81 Kan. 569, 106 Pac. 270 (1910); Green v. Alden, 92 Me.
177, 42 Atl. 358 (1898); Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150 (1858); Newton v. Bronson, 13
N.Y. 587, 67 Am. Dec. 89 (1856); Hoysradt v. Tionesta Gas Co., 194 Pa. 251, 45 Ati.
62 (1900); Illinois Steel Co. v. Konkel, 146 Wisc. 556, 131 N.W. 842 (1911). Contra,
Keith v. Proctor, 114 Ala. 676, 21 So: 502 (1897).
.
6 See Tripp v. Hutchings, 214 Ga. 330, 104 S.E.2d 423 (1958) (foreign will which
could not be probated in Georgia recorded as muniment of title.)
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the foreign executor will be in a position quite similar to that of a
devisee and thus he cannot convey a clear title until the ancillary
administration is concluded. 4 In Texas the common law rule con-
cerning the executor is restated substantially by statute." Statutes
in other states that permit action by the executor with a power of
sale vary in their terms. Usually he is required to file his papers in
the court having jurisdiction over the land." The Ohio statute, one
of the most detailed, extends to administrators, but requires papers
to be filed and sale by court approval."
Assuming that the administrator has no power of sale conferred
by a will, his only hope to obtain control over the land would seem
to lie in the Texas and New York statutes giving the personal repre-
sentative possession of the property during administration, even
though title passes immediately to the heirs or devisees." The diffi-
culty with this approach is that both statutes are in derogation of the
common law and will be strictly construed. Since neither applies
specifically to a foreign personal representative, qualification at the
situs would appear necessary to obtain possession; if so, the Virginia
administrator can exercise no powers over the New York real prop-
erty unless he qualifies.in that state. The same is true of the Texas
land subject to the leases. But what of the various royalties and delay
rentals? Can these be recovered from the lessee company as personalty?
Accrued royalties from copyrights and patents are treated in the
same manner as simple debts for purposes of collection by a foreign
personal representative. Certain mineral royalties, such as the per-
petual nonparticipating royalty, may be treated in the same way."
Accrued mineral royalties and accrued delay rentals technically may
be personalty for administration. However, the trouble is that the
4 See Klemm v. Trustees of the American Red Cross, 20 I11. App.2d 482, 156 N.E.2d
258 (1959).
"'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5§ 105, 107 (1956).
"'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-6-4 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 113-2405 (1959); I11.
Ann. Stat. ch. 3, §§ 271-73, 275 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Star. 5 7-951 (1953);
Iowa Code Ann. § 633.35 - 633.36 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-1707 (1949); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 163, § 14 (1954); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 202, 5 32 (1955); Minn.
Star. Ann. § 525.273 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-1133, 30-1134 (1956); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 554:28, 554:29, 559:12 (1955); N.M. Stat. Ann., §§ 31-16-9, 31-16-10
(1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-39.1 (1950) (retroactive); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 320.1101
(1950); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 316.30 (1958). If statutes of this type are in force, strict
compliance usually will be required to convey a good title. E g., see Hutter v. Weiss, 132
Ind. App. 244, 177 N.E.2d 339 (1961). See Stimson, Conflict of Laws and the Administra-
tion of Decedents' Real Estate, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 545 (1953); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 665 (1932).
67 Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §5 2129.14, 2129.25 (Page 1953).
"N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 123; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 37 (1956).
6" The "perpetual nonparticipating royalty" is a royalty interest created by grant or
reservation prior to a lease. The owner does not participate in the execution of the lease
or share in the cash bonus or delay rentals. Although "perpetual" is used, the royalty may
be for a term of years. See 3A Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas §§ 599, 604 (1958).
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existence of unaccrued royalties in the same estate will make necessary
an ancillary administration in the state in which the mineral rights
have their situs. Royalties which have accrued and delay rentals which
have become due under the "drill or pay" clause during the lessor's
lifetime should be treated as personalty for administration." If delay
rentals have been paid to a depository during the lifetime of the lessor
under an "unless" clause, quite clearly the deposit should be treated as
personalty.7 But royalties which do not accrue until after the death of
the lessor and delay rentals which do not become payable until that
time are treated as land for administration."'
In many of the mineral states, such as Texas, a local personal repre-
sentative is entitled to possession of land for administration.a Thus,
if land or an interest in land exists, even though personal assets have
been withdrawn from the state, there exists some possibility that
ancillary letters may issue. The situation in which the lessee company
finds itself is similar to that of the corporation which registered a
change of ownership to the name of an executor or administrator
in a foreign state prior to enactment of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act and the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers."' The difference is that the lessee company knows there is
an asset in the state which cannot be administered except by a per-
sonal representative who qualifies locally. The writer has suggested
hitherto in this article that the probability of double liability of the
payor under such circumstances has been vastly overestimated by
70 Under the "drill or pay" clause, if the lessee fails to drill within the time agreed
he then is under a duty to pay a delay rental. The lessor cannot recover the rental until the
end of the rental period unless there is an express stipulation that it is to be payable in
advance. See 2 Summers, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 338, 340. The accrued royalty or delay
rental should be handled as a debt or as rent when it has become due during the lifetime
of the lessor. United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74 (1915); Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v.
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 310 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1958); McCully v. McCully, 184 Okla.
264, 86 P.2d 786 (1939).
" Under the "unless" clause, if a well is not completed by a certain date, the lease is
void unless the lessee pays a stipulated sum for extension of his privilege. See 2 Summers,
op. cit. supra note 69, § 337, 339. There is no duty to pay rental under the "unless"
clause. It is, however, important under the clause to know to whom rental must be paid
in order to avoid termination of the lease. Usually the lease permits payment to a depository.
Id. § 348.
" United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74 (1915); Standard Oil Co. v. Marshall, 265
F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1959); Hughes v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Tex. 1961);
B.H. & M. Oil Co. v. Graves, 182 Ark. 659, 32 S.W.2d 630 (1930); In the Matter of
Estate of Patmore, 141 Cal. App. 2d 416, 296 P.2d 863 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); In re
Randolph's Estate, 175 Kan. 685, 266 P.2d 315 (1954); Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v.
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 310 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1958); McCully v. McCully, 184 Okla.
264, 86 P.2d 786 (1939). For the variation in treatment of these interests as realty or per-
sonalty, see 1 Williams & Myers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 213-215 (1962).
"aTex. Prob. Code § 37 (1956).




the commentators."5 The writer doubts that knowledge of an asset
which can be administered only locally increases the risk of a double
recovery, although undeniably some risk exists unless an ancillary
administration is required."6
A lessee company could pay royalties accruing after the death
of the lessor and delay rentals to the heirs or devisees. The cur-
rent practice, however, seems to be to require an ancillary admin-
istration; the foreign personal representative cannot attack this policy
successfully since generally it is settled that a local debtor cannot be
compelled to pay without local qualification. The most, therefore,
that our Virginia administrator might expect to recover in Texas
without ancillary letters is royalties or delay rentals paid over by the
lessee company to a depository during the lifetime of the lessor. These
deposits should be handled like simple debts. Royalties due but not
yet paid by the lessee company probably will not be paid except to
an ancillary administrator in Texas.
V. THE NORTH CAROLINA ASSETS
A. Obtaining Access To The Safe Deposit Box
Two steps will be necessary to obtain access to the Colonel's safe
deposit box at the Tarheel bank." The State Police, who have the
key and possibly other effects of the decedent picked up at the wreck,
have inventoried these items and will deliver them to a personal
representative who presents papers showing his authority." Getting
into the safe deposit box will be more difficult. A number of states
still leave access to safe deposit boxes within the control of individual
banks. In these states, such as Virginia, the rules concerning safe
deposit boxes vary from locality to locality, and in some instances a
variation will exist among branches of the same bank. A bank, for
example, may admit the personal representative without question if
he has the key and if he produces his letters. In contrast, some banks
may require the personal representative to obtain a court order."
North Carolina is one of a growing number of states which, for
tax reasons, have placed controls upon the opening of safe deposit
boxes."0 The statute requires the bank to retain a sufficient portion of
"s See text accompanying note 51 supra.
7 Davis, Ancillary Administration of Oil and Gas Leases in Kansas: A Legal Conun-
drum, 5 Kan. L. Rev. 452 (1957); Morris, Oil and Gas Interests in Decedents' Estates, 93
Trusts & Estates 890 (1954).
7 See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.7 8N.C. Gen. Star. § 15-11 (1953).
71 See Lamb, Virginia Probate Practice 10 (1957).
"'N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-24 (1958).
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the contents of the safe deposit box to pay the taxes due upon the
property unless the Commissioner of Revenue consents to the trans-
fer. If the money found is 300 dollars or less, the clerk of the
superior court of the resident county of the decedent can consent
to the transfer. When the box is opened, the clerk of the superior
court of the county in which the box is located or his representative
must be present with an officer of the bank to make an inventory of
the contents. Copies of this inventory are furnished to the Commis-
sioner of Revenue, to the bank, and to the personal representative.
This statute seems sufficiently broad to extend to a foreign domi-
ciliary representative, but regardless of the amount discovered in
the box, the tax waiver should be obtained from the Commissioner
of Revenue rather than from the clerk. Upon presentation of the
Virginia letters, the clerk or his representative and an officer of the
bank will open the box. It is hoped that sufficient assets will be found
to justify the ceremony.
B. Action Under The North Carolina Death By Wrongful Act Statute
By far the most important asset in North Carolina is likely to be
the claim for wrongful death against the driver of the other car in
the accident in which the Colonel was killed. Will local appointment
be necessary in order to sue? If a local appointment is required, a
North Carolina resident will have to be obtained as ancillary admin-
istrator. Although a non-resident administrator cannot be appointed
in North Carolina, a non-resident executor may qualify locally. s'
By the common law rule, generally a foreign personal representa-
tive cannot sue without local letters. s2 However, exceptions are made
to the common law rule if the foreign personal representative sues
in his own right (as upon bearer paper or upon a foreign judgment) ,"a
if a local court permits him to sue by comity to prevent injustice, 4
or if the defendant waives the incapacity of the personal representa-
tive to sue."5 Furthermore, statutes in a number of states permit suit
"N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-8(2) (1950).
"2See III Beale, Conflict of Laws 1532 (1935) and cases cited therein; 11 Colum. L.
Rev. 563 (1911); 36 Notre Dame Law. 218 (1961); 13 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 252 (1958).S"Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 166 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Moore v.
Kraft, 179 Fed. 685 (7th Cir. 1910); Schlorer v. Mangin, 39 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.Y.
1941); McCraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.2d 536 (1945); Reed v. Hollister,
95 Ore. 656, 188 Pac. 170 (1920); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 509 (1934); 55
Mich. L. Rev. 261 (1956); 8 Minn. L. Rev. 544 (1924).
'"Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852 (1937); In re Chisholm's Will,
108 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
"SBrown v. Nourse, 55 Me. 230 (1867); Farmers Trust Co. v. Bradshow, 242 N.Y.S.
598 (N.Y. City Ct. 1930) (pleading to the merits); Jolley v. Sloan, 61 Ga. App. 747,
7 S.E.2d 325 (1940) (filing a counter claim). An exception also may be made for an
executor who has a power of sale over land because this power may be sufficiently broad
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without local qualification if the foreign personal representative meets
certain conditions, such as recording or filing his letters locally."
Under some of the Death by Wrongful Act statutes, an exception
permitting suit by a foreign personal representative is made if the
recovery is not for the estate generally and creditors cannot reach
the assets recovered."7 But these statutes are construed strictly, since
they change the common law by creating a new remedy.
The North Carolina Death by Wrongful Act statute refers to the
"executor, administrator or collector""8 of the decedent as the person
entitled to bring the action. A recovery is not applied as assets in
paying debts or legacies, but it may be used to pay burial expenses
and it is distributed in accordance with the North Carolina intestate
law."
Although the North Carolina Statute may seem at first glance to
permit recovery by a foreign personal representative without local
qualification, the North Carolina Supreme Court has required ap-
pointment of a resident personal representative to sue.' Since the
to sustain a suit to implement it. Doe v. McFarland, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 151 (1815). A
personal representative of a stockholder also may sue in a stockholder's derivative action
without local qualification. North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
S"Ala. Code tit. 61, § 146 (1960) (give security for costs); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-805
(1962) (execute bond); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-6-7 (1953); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12,
55 1561, 1562, 1563 (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 20-505 (1961); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 734.30
(1964); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 113-2401, 113-2402, 113-2403 (1959); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, 5
265 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-753 (1953); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-1708
(1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 395.170 (1960); La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3331 (Supp. 1963);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 154, § 89 (1954) (perhaps extends to collection by suit); Md.
Ann. Code art. 93, § 83 (1957) (limited to executor or administrator appointed in District
of Columbia); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.05 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. 5 622 (1956); Neb.
Rev. Stat. 5 30-807 (1956); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:12-7 (1953); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-9
(1953); N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 160 (Supp. 1963); N.D. Cent. Code § 30-24-18 (1960)
(may be limited to executor appointed locally but resident elsewhere); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
5 2113.75 (Page 1954); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, 5 262 (1937); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20,
§ 320.1101 (1950); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-18-26 (1956); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-600
(1962) (probably extends to collection by suit); S.D. Code § 35.1103 (1939); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 287.16 (1958). Extending the power to sue to a foreign personal representative
may not extend to a power to sue to recover realty if this does not pass into the hands of
the personal representative. Bowen v. Willard, 203 Minn. 599, 281 N.W. 256 (1938);
23 Minn. L. Rev. 373 (1939).
87 Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc.,
149 F.2d 3M1, 162 A.L.R. 318 (2d Cir. 1945); Carter v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 F.R.D. 477
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); La May v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 25 (W.D.Va. 1946); Demattei v.
Missouri, K. & T.R.R. 345 Mo. 1136, 139 S.W.2d 504 (1940); Wiener v. Specific Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E.2d 673 (1949); 12 Ga. B.J. 501 (1950); Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 563 (1930). Usually the terms of the statute are such that the foreign personal
representative cannot sue. Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956); Barnes v.
Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 198 (D. Idaho 1956); Noel v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.,
147 F. Supp. 432 (D. Conn. 1956); Siebenhar v. Wise, 16 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
"SN.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-173 (1950). A "collector" under North Carolina law is the
same as a "curator" or temporary personal representative. N.C. Gen. Stat. 5§ 28-25, 28-28
(1950).
( Hartness v. Pharr, 133 N.C. 566, 45 S.E. 901 (1903).
'Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.2d 673 (1940), cerl. denied, 312 U.S.
684 (1941); Hall v. Southern Ry., 146 N.C. 345, 59 S.E. 879 (1907). Serible, Rybolt v.
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statute creates the right of action, there seems to be no escape from
its limitations even if the tort-feasor could be found in another state
having more liberal rules than North Carolina concerning suit by a
foreign personal representative. North Carolina law still will be
applied to determine the capacity of parties to assert rights pursuant
to it.
Getting the case into a federal court will not help either. If a right
of action is created by a federal statute, such as the Federal Employers
Liability Act,"' the foreign personal representative can sue in a federal
court without ancillary letters.9" However, the foreign personal
representative is a state official and is subject to the rule in Moore v.
Mitchell" and to the last sentence of federal rule 17 (b), under which
his capacity to sue is determined by the law of the state in which the
district court sits. 4 If the law of the state requires recordation of
letters before suit, the foreign personal representative should meet
this condition before suing in a federal court.9' But if the action is
based upon a statute creating a new right and limiting the capacity
of parties to assert it, the statute will be followed in the federal court
no matter where the tort-feasor is found. In King v. Cooper Motor
Lines,"' a Maryland resident was killed in North Carolina in a col-
lision with the truck of a South Carolina Corporation. A Maryland
administratrix sued the South Carolina corporation in the Federal
District Court in Maryland for wrongful death of her intestate based
upon the North Carolina law. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that the administratrix had failed to qualify in North
Carolina, which she could not do under the North Carolina law. The
court stated:9'
[I]n the light of the North Carolina statutes, decisions and practice, it
is evident that North Carolina considers that it has a real interest in
Jarrett, 112 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1940); Noel v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 147 F. Supp.
432 (D. Conn. 1956), noted in 35 Texas L. Rev. 714 (1957); Battese v. Union Pac. R.R.,
102 Kan. 468, 170 Pac. 811 (1918). See 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1918); 47 W. Va. L. Q.
60 (1940).
9135 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
92Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1946); Annot., 72 A.L.R. 1030
(1931). See Buchheit v. United Air Lines, 202 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
93281 U.S. 18 (1930) (state tax officer lacks requisite legal capacity to sue in a federal
court in another state for the collection of taxes due his state).
94 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). The principle of Rule 17b as applied to a natural person also
should apply to a corporation suing in a representative capacity as fiduciary. U. S. Epperson
Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga. 1958); Southern Ohio Say. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 27 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
9' Langford v. Merickel, 199 F. Supp. 242 (D. Minn. 1961); Rodgers v. Irvine, 161
F. Supp. 784 (W.D.Va. 1957). Cf. Smith v. Potomac Edison Co., 165 F. Supp. 681 (D.
Md. 1958). See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 5 17.19 (2d ed. 1963).




controlling the distribution of any amounts recovered in an action
brought to recover for a wrongful death which occurred in that state,
and that no one except an executor, administrator or collector qualified
in North Carolina has a right to bring such an action in North Carolina
or elsewhere....
Although assignments have been used effectively to avoid limita-
tions upon the power of a foreign personal representative to sue in
some instances,98 only the fiduciaries named can sue under the North
Carolina statute and a local appointment cannot be avoided if the
remedy is to be pursued. Therefore, the Virginia administrator will
save time and money if he seeks to have a resident ancillary admin-
istrator appointed in North Carolina.
VI. COLLECTING ASSETS UNDER FEDERAL CONTROL
A domiciliary personal representative attempting to collect foreign
assets a generation ago might have expected, at the worst, difficulty
in persuading a local official or local debtor to release the property
without administration. Today, quite frequently he must deal with
federal officials executing federal policies which may determine the
number of administrations necessary to assemble assets in the domicile.
For example, a large percentage of the United States population, male
and female, will be at some time in the armed or civil services in this
country or abroad, or will be dependents of these persons. Many will
die while in that status. Tourists, businessmen, and tax exiles will
die in foreign countries. Veterans and non-veterans will be admitted
to and die in federal hospitals. If federal care for the aged is extended
to providing shelter and subsistence in organized centers, federal
authority may be extended to administration of the estates of persons
who have enjoyed this largesse. To what degree do current federal
policies concerning a decedent's property when under federal con-
trol invite ancillary (state) administrations?
A. Armed Services Personnel
The Colonel has property at his military station in Bremerhaven."
He also has property in Groningen, Holland. Quite probably, he is
due back pay from the United States. The problems encountered in
collecting assets in these situations are somewhat different from those
encountered if federal authority is not involved directly. If a federal
9E.g., Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865). But the courts have not per-
mitted an assignee for collection only to bring the action.
"The case of the hypothetical decedent considered in this article appears at pp. 336-37
supra.
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officer holds the assets within a nondomiciliary state or in a foreign
country, the threat of ancillary administration will become par-
ticularly acute.
In most of the federal statutes and regulations bearing upon inven-
tory and distribution of decedents' assets, one can detect a basic
policy of supporting state administrations of estates, of avoiding
multiple administrations, and of expediting delivery of the property
to those entitled thereto by the law of the state in which the decedent
was domiciled. The domiciliary personal representative may be able
to use the federal administrative machinery to avoid ancillary admin-
istrations or increased administrative cost. On the other hand, there
always will be an element of latitude in administrative discretion
to be exercised by the federal officer which might invite an ancillary
administration if the domiciliary personal representative fails to act
with due speed and care. Certain federal statutes and regulations
also may establish policies in which the regular conduct of a domi-
ciliary administration is a subordinate matter. An early aberration of
this type was the statute directing payment of an enlistment bonus
of a deceased Civil War soldier directly to designated members of his
family without administration.'" Similar departures may be seen
today in the handling of death gratuities and back pay of deceased
military personnel. Furthermore, if assets are located abroad, treaties
and executive agreements likely will have a bearing upon the time
and economy in collecting the assets of a decedent. Policies are ex-
pressed in these international transactions in which domiciliary admin-
istrations may be only of incidental importance.
Whatever these policies affecting distribution of decedents' assets
may be, so long as they are shown to have a reasonable relation to
the constitutional powers of the Congress or of the President, the
tenth amendment cannot be expected to protect state jurisdiction in
the administration of estates. In addition to the obvious inroads upon
state control made by the federal revenue laws, recent rulings of the
United States Supreme Court concerning co-ownership and survivor-
ship provisions in United States savings bonds have indicated clearly
the federal supremacy based upon the power of Congress to borrow
money."' It thus behooves the domiciliary personal representative to
avoid a clash between state and federal power in collecting assets
because almost certainly the state power will yield. Instead, the domi-
ciliary personal representative should work within the framework of
the federal statutes and regulations, utilizing if he can the federal
o See Alford, The Influence of the American Civil War Upon the Growth of the Law
of Decedents' Estates and Trusts, 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 299, 318-21 (1960).
"' Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
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administrative institutions and acting promptly to avoid distributions
of property which may invite ancillary administrations.
1. Assets in Estates of Deceased Servicemen Several categories of assets
relevant to the problem of multiple administration may be involved
in the estate of a deceased serviceman. If the serviceman is a non-
professional, such as a soldier in an initial period of enlistment or an
officer on a brief tour of duty, there likely will be stationary assets
(such as a savings account) in his state of domicile, which may induce
a domiciliary administration. At his temporary military residence-
i.e., his place of assignment or station-there will be ambulatory assets
which he carries with him from assignment to assignment. Ambula-
tory assets are likely to include an automobile, bank accounts, cur-
rency, stock certificates, bonds, and sundry personal items. Generally,
however, the assets of the nonprofessional serviceman will tend to be
stationary. Therefore, the nonprofessional servicemen tends to create
no great problems in the avoidance of ancillary administration.
On the other hand, the assets of the professional serviceman will
tend to be ambulatory, and for this reason avoidance of multiple
administration will be more difficult. The professional serviceman also
tends to acquire at successive assignments real estate which he retains
as rental property for income tax benefits. During World Wars I
and II and the Korean War, the armed services were greatly expanded
by calling nonprofessionals to duty, but the number of ancillary
administrations for service personnel did not tend to increase in
proportion to the expansion; rather ancillary administrations remained
substantially fixed in number in relation to the size of the professional
armed services.
The domicile of the professional serviceman also may be difficult
to determine. The armed services have tended to rely upon the home
of record at the date of enlistment or orders to active duty of the
serviceman in determining domicile.' Although not conclusive upon
state courts, of course, these determinations have probative value. If
property of a deceased serviceman is in a foregin country and military
or consular authorities do not assume control of it, the foreign
country may apply a different domicile test than that familiar in the
United States; or it may determine jurisdiction for administration
and the persons entitled to distribution by "nationality" rather than
by "domicile."'' Thus, the professional serviceman should establish
a domicile by developing evidence which will be persuasive in a
102 E.g., I Dig. Ops. JAG 350 (1951-52) Oct. 27, 1951.
a Problems raised by the doctrine of "universality of succession" and the succession
doctrines based on nationality are discussed hereafter in this Article. See paragraph following
note 181 infra and text accompanying notes 186-90 infra.
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state court. He also should avoid concentrating his personal estate
in any foreign country which might claim him or his relatives as
domiciliaries or as nationals.
The ambulatory assets of deceased servicemen-the assets which are
critical if a personal representative seeks to avoid multiple admin-
istrations-may be divided into three groups for ease in considera-
tion. The first group consists of movable assets located in communi-
ties adjacent to the deceased serviceman's post, base, or station. Except
in overseas areas, a situation discussed hereafter in this article,'"o these
movables present the same problems of collection as those of non-
military personnel. These assets do not pass under military control,
and military authorities do not take possession of land or rentals or
other income therefrom. The second group consists of movables which
the decedent leaves at his military station, such as the assets we believe
the Colonel left at Bremerhaven.' °5 These assets do pass temporarily
under military control, and federal policies are significant in planning
for their collection. The third group consists of claims held by the
decedent against the United States, such as claims for back pay and
claims for soldiers' deposits with interest.
2. Recovering Movable Personal Estate Under Military Control The
movable assets of deceased servicemen found at a post, station, or
base at which the decedent was stationed are safeguarded and in-
ventoried by his immediate commanding officer, the installation
commander, or his representative.' If the deceased serviceman is not
quartered upon the military post, these assets (other than bank
accounts upon the post, securities and other commercial papers kept
in a safe deposit box there, and a motor vehicle which might be upon
the post at his death) seldom will be of sufficient value to excite an
104 See text accompanying notes 171-81 infra.
'°3See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent considered in this
Article.
"o The most detailed procedures for any of the services established by statute for dis-
position of the effects of deceased servicemen apply to the Army and the Air Force. These
statutes are almost identical and are based upon old Article of War 112, 41 Stat. 809
(1920). See 10 U.S.C. S 4712 (1958) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 9712 (1958) (Air Force).
The statutory provisions for the Navy and Marine Corps are less detailed. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 6522 (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 718.3 (1962). The statutory provision for the Coast Guard
is brief. See 14 U.S.C. § 507 (1958). The provision for the Coast and Geodetic Survey is
negligible. See 70A Stat. 619 (1956), 33 U.S.C. § 857a (1958). The comments in this
article are based primarily upon the statutes applying to the Army and Air Force and upon
32 C.F.R. § 511.4 (1962), which sets forth the Army Regulations for the disposition of
assets under noncombat conditions. Army Regulation 643-55, 2 June 1961, covers dis-
position of personal effects under combat conditions. The Theatre Commander, if the situ-
ation permits, in his discretion may use the techniques used for disposing of assets under
noncombat conditions. The effects are returned to the Army Effects Office, Continental
United States, where procedures similar to those used in a noncombat situation are followed.
The zeal of the foreign domiciliary personal representative in any event should not lead
him to pursue assets in a combat area.
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attempt to recover them by the domiciliary personal representative.
The case of the Colonel, however, is one in which assets of significant
value may have been left at his post in Bremerhaven."" The control
of the commanding officer or installation commander does not extend
to assets not found at the post, station, or base, although in foreign
countries the concept of a post, station, or base may be extended to
recover assets not under technical military jurisdiction."8
The commanding officer or installation commander assumes the
function of a custodian of those assets which do come under his
control and is limited to safeguarding and inventorying the items.
This officer does, however, exercise some discretion concerning the
person to whom these assets are delivered after his ministerial func-
tions have been performed. The officer delivers the assets"'e to the
"surviving spouse or legal representative" if either of these persons
is "present at the installation" at which the effects are located.1" In
the usual case-unlike that of the Colonel, whose wife is living in
New York-the surviving spouse will be present at the installation.
Quite frequently she ultimately will qualify as executrix or will be
appointed in the domicile as administratrix. But it is also quite
obvious that if the decedent were stationed in California and his wife
were living with him, the wife could not be expected to qualify in
a distant state of domicile, such as Virginia, until much time had
elapsed. She may be tempted to seek an ancillary administration in
California, or be forced to do so by the importunities of local credi-
tors. If so, she may face a subsequent domiciliary administration in
Virginia.
Suppose the spouse is present at the installation and is not nomi-
nated in the will as executrix or for some reason cannot be appointed
as administratrix? A domiciliary personal representative seldom will
be able to qualify in Virginia (or anywhere else) and arrive at the
California installation before the commanding officer delivers the
assets to the surviving spouse. The domiciliary representative prob-
ably will be required to produce a certificate of death of the dece-
dent or conclusive evidence of death before letters will be issued in
the domicile. Obtaining this certificate will require time."' If the
107 See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent considered in this
Article.
.s See Digest of Opinions, Judge Advocate General of the Army 1912-40 Dig. Ops.
JAG 386, § 470(2), 210.871, Jan. 10, 1919, 220.871, Mar. 12, 1919.
' In addition to the less valuable items (such as automobiles, personal weapons and
equipment), commercial paper, stocks, bonds, checks (including government checks payable
to the deceased), military payment orders, and all domestic and foreign currency are de-
livered. See 32 C.F.R. S 511.4(2)(h) (1962).
11032 C.F.R. § 511.4(2)(g) (1962).
... If the person is missing rather than known to be dead, the procedure under the
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assets are delivered to the spouse, even though delivery does not affect
title, the domiciliary personal representative may have to sue her in
a foreign state in order to obtain possession. As indicated earlier in
this article, the personal representative may need ancillary letters
to sue.112
Suppose the unusual case arises in which both the surviving spouse
and the personal representative are present at the installation and
both claim the assets. Which claim will have priority? If the
surviving spouse has been guilty of some impropriety, such as
killing her husband, the balance may be tilted thereby in favor
of the personal representative.113 But there is no standard for judg-
ment in the statute or in the regulations to serve as a guide to
the commanding officer. The spouse may argue with some foun-
dation that the "legal representative" described in both the statute
and regulations11 ' is her "agent" and not the "personal representa-
tive" of the deceased serviceman. The administrative construction
of "legal representative" in the statute and in the regulations
has been the duly qualified or appointed personal representative
of the decedent. 1 The statute currently in force states that "the
commanding officer of the place or command shall permit the legal
representative or the surviving spouse of the deceased, if present, to
take possession of the effects of the deceased that are then in camp
or quarters.' 16. This reference appears to describe a personal repre-
sentative of a decedent. The provisions of the statute dealing with
distribution by a summary court-martial, discussed hereafter,"' only
refer to "the surviving spouse or legal representative,"'' . and do not
make the distinction clear. The regulations dealing with distribution
by the commanding officer also refer to the case in which the "sur-
viving spouse or legal representative is present."'' . In view of the
infrequency with which the personal representative of the decedent
might appear to receive an immediate delivery of the assets by the
commanding officer, an agent for the surviving spouse reasonably
Missing Persons Act, 56 Stat. 146 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. S 1012 (1958),
32 C.F.R. § 511.4(m)(2) (1962), follows substantially the procedure upon death. In
cases of missing persons, it is usually impossible to obtain letters of administration or pro-
bate of a will without complying with detailed statutory procedures entailing considerable
delay. Perhaps a temporary custodian or committee for the absentee could be appointed
to claim the property.
112 See note 86 supra for statutes permitting suit without local qualification.
"' See 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 389, § 470(6) 210.871, Sept. 22, 1923.
11410 U.S.C. § 4712 (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 511.4 (1962).
"'E.g., 3 Dig. Ops. JAG 547 (1953-54) Sept. 2, 1953; 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 387-88,
§ 470 (4).
"o 10 U.S.C. § 4712(a) (1958).
... See text accompanying notes 146-65 inlra.
..'10 U.S.C. 5 4712(d)(1) (1958).
"'32 C.F.R. 5 $11.4(g) (1962).
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might have been intended by the Congress by the use of the term
"legal representative." The positive statement by Colonel Winthrop,
indicating that "legal representative" is the duly qualified personal
representative of the decedent, refers to the provision in Article of
War 127 of 1874,120 which did not mention the surviving spouse but
directed delivery "to the legal representative of such deceased officer
or soldier.'' Although the "legal representative" mentioned in the
current law is almost certainly the personal representative of the
decedent, the matter is not fully free from doubt since both the
statute and regulations fail to define the term.
Assuming the surviving spouse does not prevail in her argument
that the statute and regulations refer to her agent and not to the
decedent's personal representative, it is likely in any event that the
commanding officer will deliver the assets to her. The personal repre-
sentative then will be left to his own resources to acquire them. The
commanding officer would not wish, after all, to invite the risk that
the surviving spouse might be stripped of her husband's assets and
perhaps left at the mercy of local creditors while the domiciliary
personal representative carries the assets back to the domicile and
administers them ther. This would be brutal treatment to a sur-
viving spouse despite the death gratuity,'2' back pay,"' dependency
and indemnity compensation," 4 and survivor assistance..' to which she
probably will be entitled.
The amount or value of the assets held for delivery should have
a bearing upon the judgment of the commanding officer. If the value
is great, he well might distribute part to the surviving spouse and
part to the personal representative, since this alternative is clearly
not precluded either by the statute or by the regulations."' If ancillary
letters have issued in the state or country in which the military post,
station, or base is located, the assets should be delivered to the ancil-
lary personal representative, even though the spouse and domiciliary
personal representative also apply for the assets. Although the com-
manding officer is in the position of an involuntary bailee of the
property.. and not of a debtor owing money to the decedent, his
1"'18 Stat. (Part 1) 241 (1873-74).
222 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 763 (2d ed. 1896). The language is traceable
to the British Articles of War of 1765, art. XVII of which was in force in the colonies at
the beginning of the Revolution. The current wording was introduced in Article of War
112 of 1916, 39 Stat. 668 (1916).
... 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-1480 (1958); 32 U.S.C. § 321 (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 533.1-
533.7 (1962).
1"310 U.S.C. 5 2771 (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 533.20-533.24 (1962).
124 38 U.S.C. §§ 401-422 (1958).
"'See 32 C.F.R. 5§ 511.8-511.10 (1962).
12610 U.S.C. § 4712 (1958); 32 C.F.R. 5 511.4 (1962).
". See Brown, Personal Property 399-415 (2d ed. 1955).
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release of a decedent's property to a domiciliary personal representa-
tive or to the surviving spouse after issue of local letters may render
him personally liable to an ancillary administrator for its value. How-
ever, a defense probably can be rested successfully upon the option
as to delivery conferred upon the commanding officer by the federal
statute. This case should be distinguished from that in which an
ancillary personal representative from a state other than that in which
the installation is located claims the property. In this situation either
the surviving spouse or the domiciliary personal representative should
receive the assets.
In any case in which the commanding officer delivers property to
a personal representative from a state other than the state in which
the installation is located, he should require in addition to the receipt
stipulated in the regulations"8 an affidavit that all taxes and debts of
the decedent in the state have been paid and that there is no local
administration. The commanding officer also should obtain an agree-
ment from the personal representative to indemnify him in the event
of a successful recovery by a creditor, distributee, or legatee of the
value of the property delivered.
To minimize the possibility of an ancillary administration if the
commanding officer of the deceased serviceman has custody of the
property, a prospective personal representative in the domicile should
notify the commanding officer in writing as soon as practicable that
domiciliary letters will be sought. Retention of the assets by the
commanding officer should be requested until the domiciliary personal
representative qualifies and has authority to receive delivery. Nothing
in the regulations seems to prevent the commanding officer from
waiting a few days until the personal representative appears at the
installation. The commanding officer may act within his sound dis-
cretion unless neither the spouse nor the personal representative is
present at the installation. In the latter case a summary court-martial
must be appointed to take custody of the assets.1"
Although the summary court does not administer the estate of
the decedent under military control, it is authorized but not required
to perform several functions normally performed by an executor or
administrator. The court has discretionary power to collect debts due
the deceased serviceman by local debtors and to pay local and undis-
puted creditors of the decedent to the extent permitted by money of
the deceased in the court's possession. Under special circumstances
the court is required to convert by sale certain of the decedent's assets
1232 C.F.R. § 511.4(g) (1962).
1210 U.S.C. § 4712(b) (1958).
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into cash. The summary court may decide not to exercise the powers
to collect local debts and to pay local creditors. Furthermore, under
the administrative construction of the statute, a local debtor may
refuse to pay the summary court after demand by the court for
payment is made.3'
The power of the summary court to collect debts and to pay
creditors is limited. Only debts from local debtors may be collected.
At installations in the United States, "local" is construed to mean
only debtors at the installation and not those in adjacent communi-
ties. The Judge Advocate General of the Army has advised, for
example, that bonds in the custory of a Federal Reserve Bank repre-
sented by a receipt among the effects of the decedent at the military
installation cannot be recovered by the summary court.131 However,
the construction of "local" appears to be broader in overseas areas
and may be extended to cover a collection of debts in the country in
which the decedent was stationed.13
In addition to the limitation upon the power of the summary
court to pay only local creditors, the claim must be undisputed or
unquestionably valid. If the court elects to pay creditors with claims
of this description, the payments must be made with currency which
the decedent leaves." The proceeds from negotiable instruments made
payable to the decedent in settlement of debts due from local credi-
tors probably will be treated as money of the deceased available to
pay creditors. 3 ' The same treatment probably will be given to money
collected in the discharge of simple debts. However, the proceeds
from military pay certificates and payment orders, 3 and checks
drawn payable to deceased on the Treasurer of the United States or
on foreign depositorie s ' cannot be used to pay creditors. Also foreign
currency in excess of one month's basic pay and allowances of the
's° See 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 386, § 470(2), 210.871, Jan. 10, 1919, 220.871, Mar. 12,
1919. These opinions dealt with collection of a French debt under circumstances in which
the Congress, lacking territorial authority, could not have required the debtor to pay. The
underlying idea, however, appears to be that even if the Congress has power to require
a domestic debtor to pay on demand, the summary court has not been made an administrator
or executor, and there is no requirement (under state law at any rate) that a debtor pay
unless the personal representative is acting under the authority of the state in which the
debtor resides or is found.131 7 Dig. Ops. JAG 238 (1957-58).
132 A deposit by an American soldier during World War I in a bank in Paris has been
construed as a "local" debt under Article of War 112. 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 386,
470(2), 210.871, Jan. 10, 1919, Mar. 12, 1919.
'3310 U.S.C. 5 4712(c) (1958); 4 Dig. Os. JAG 401 (1954-55), Dec. 21, 1954.
'34See 32 C.F.R. § 511.4(h) (3) (i) (1962) ("the proceeds will be disposed of in the
same manner as currency found among the effects.").
13132 C.F.R. §§ 511.4(h)(2)(iv)(a-c), 511.4(h)(3)(iv) (1962).
"632 C.F.R. § 511.4(h)(3)(iii) (1962). Bank deposit books, stocks, bonds, and
negotiable instruments (including travellers checks and money orders) will be transmitted
to the next of kin or legal representative with other effects.
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decedent may not be converted to pay creditors.137 In a foreign state,
such as West Germany, in which the foreign currency might be
accepted by creditors without conversion, there would seem to be
no objection to its local use for this purpose even though such cur-
rency is in excess of one month's basic pay and allowances of the
decedent. There also would seem to be no objection to payments to
creditors with funds received from the domiciliary personal repre-
sentative, although the summary court would act as the agent of the
foreign personal representative for this purpose.
The summary court has no power of sale to raise funds for the
payment of creditors. The Judge Advocate General of the Army
has advised that an automobile subject to a chattel mortgage lien
can be sold and the proceeds therefrom used to pay the secured debt,
if such action is expressly directed by the person entitled to the
vehicle under old Article of War 112."3' The person entitled to the
automobile, if sui juris, may be estopped to complain if the proceeds
of sale are insufficient to discharge the balance of the debt. It seems
clear that the summary court acts as agent for the owner in this
situation and cannot claim the protection of the federal statute'3
pertaining to the duties of the court.
The deceased Colonel's assets in Bremerhaven' ° are probably now
in the custody of a summary court, since neither the spouse nor the
personal representative was on hand to claim them. Therefore, it
will be in the interest of the estate to utilize the summary court pro-
cedures to the fullest extent possible. The "partial administration" by
the summary court-even in countries such as West Germany which
apply the rule of univerality of succession, discussed hereafter'-will
avoid the cost and responsibility for a foreign agent to make collec-
tions and to determine the propriety of claims. The domiciliary per-
sonal representative also will find that even in a domestic administra-
tion, the summary court can determine debts due the decedent and
the propriety of creditors' claims more effectively than can a personal
'" See 32 C.F.R. § 511.4(h)(2)(ii) (1962).
'38 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 392-93, § 470(10), 210.871, Oct. 11, 1932. Cf. 220.871,
Aug. 24, 1927, in which the summary court was advised to deliver the automobile to the
nearest relative and to notify the lienholder of the action contemplated. This is sound ad-
vice. If property is held under conditional sales agreements, the summary court may act
properly in allowing the vendor to repossess the property; but the better course, again,
would be to turn over the property to the next of kin or legal representative and to notify
the creditor. 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 391, § 470(8), 220.871, Oct. 6, 1931 (conditional
sale of a watch); 451.1, Aug. 2, 1934 (could not determine widow and no legal repre-
sentative so surrendered car to dealer who held chattel mortgage).
'39 10 U.S.C. § 4712 (1958).
"'The case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this article appears at pp. 336-37
SuPra.14 See text accompanying note 43 asupra and paragraph following note 181 in fra.
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representative who lacks knowledge of the customs of the post and
access to channels of information to verify statements made to him.
Care should be taken not to designate the summary court as an agent
of the domiciliary personal representative unless the personal repre-
sentative is in a position to evaluate the ability of the summary
court and the probable prudence of the court in discharging its
responsibilities.
Caution in the domiciliary personal representative's relationship to
the summary court is especially important if the summary court is
encouraged to exercise the power of sale. The advantages to be reaped
by the domiciliary personal representative from a sale by the summary
court are many. The sale probably will be conducted without cost
to the estate. Also the expense of returning to the domicile certain
types of property (such as automobiles) that are situated in another
state or in a foreign country can be avoided, and at the same time a
higher price often can be obtained by the summary court than can be
obtained in the domicile.
The summary court has no general power of sale, but the com-
manding officer may authorize a sale of certain items if "the spouse
or other person entitled to receive the effects is not present."'42 These
items may include motor vehicles, bulky household equipment, and
similar personal effects if the sale is in the interest of the government,
if an emergency exists, and if a reasonable effort where practicable
is made to determine the desires of the next of kin or the legal
representative of the decedent. A sale also can be authorized by the
commanding officer if the sale is in the interest both of the Govern-
ment and the person entitled to receive the property and if the latter
party has given a power of attorney to the summary court to sell.
This case should be distinguished from that in which the summary
court sells without the express authority of the commanding officer
but upon the verbal or informal written authority of the person
entitled to receive the property.'43 In either case, however, if the
personal representative makes the summary court his agent, he is
liable for the acts of his agent to the same extent that he would be
if the agent were a military person acting in a private capacity.'"
If the administrator can persuade the summary court in Bremer-
14232 C.F.R. § 511.4(m) (4) (1962). Pursuant to powers contained in the Missing Per-
sons Act, technically the authority extends to a case in which a serviceman is known dead
and his spouse or personal representative is not present but their whereabouts and addresses
are known. 56 Stat. 146 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1012 (1958).
143 See note 138 supra.
'"The domiciliary personal representative thus should expect to have his conduct in
appointing the officer serving as summary court as agent and his action in supervising this
officer measured by the prudent man standard.
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haven to collect local debts and pay local creditors, a substantial part
of the estate work will be performed at the government's expense.
Whether the court can be persuaded to collect the assets in Groningen,
Holland,"5 is doubtful. But in order to eliminate sources of friction
produced by the presence of a foreign military force, the local mili-
tary authorities at Bremerhaven may be persuaded to settle the
Colonel's affairs at Groningen also. However, the collection of these
assets quite possibly will be left to the local United States consul.
After these short steps have been taken to gather the assets of the
decedent and to pay some or all of his creditors, the property will
be delivered to the person highest on a list set forth in the statute
"who can be found by the court." The first category listed is "the
surviving spouse or legal representative.' '. 6 The same possibility of
inviting an ancillary administration exists at this point as when
delivery is made by the commanding officer without action by the
summary court. However, more time usually will be available in
which domiciliary letters can issue and in which the summary court
can be notified of a claim by the personal representative. The Judge
Advocate General of the Army has advised that if a decedent dies
leaving a will, the summary court is put on nfotice that a personal
representative may claim the property in preference to the next of
kin. Under these circumstances the summary court should hold the
assets for a reasonable time after receiving notice of the will to de-
termine whether a personal representative will be designated.' If
there is no spouse or legal representative, the assets are distributed by
the summary court in the following order:"" (1) son, (2) daughter,
(3) father, (4) mother, (5) brother, (6) sister, (7) grandfather,4 '
(8) grandmother,"' (9) next of kin, (10) person standing in loco
Parentis to decedent,"' (11) beneficiary designated in will of the
decedent. The senior member of a class is entitled to delivery. Within
the class of next of kin, the preferred member is the senior male who
is in closest degree of kinship to the decedent as determined by the
civil law method of computation."' The parents do not take if
custody has been granted to another person by court decree, in which
case the blood relative or parent by adoption who was granted legal
145 See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent considered in this
Article.
'46 10 U.S.C. § 4712(d) (1958).
147 1912-40 Dig. Ops. JAG 391, 220.871, Mar. 21, 1932.
14110 U.S.C. § 4712(d)2-9 (1958).
149 32 C.F.R. § 511.6(a) (9) (1962).
" 32 C.F.R. § 511.6(a) (10) (1962).
'5' 32 C.F.R.'§ 511.6(a) (12) (1962).
1'232 C.F.R. § 511.6(a)(11) (1962).
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
custody is substituted. The father does not take if he has abandoned
the support of his family."' The surviving spouse does not take if she
was legally separated from the decedent or has remarried.'
Title to the property is said to be unaffected by delivery thereof
by the summary court to persons in the categories described,"' and
the problem of the personal representative in eventually obtaining
possession of the property is simplified by the distribution of all of
the property to a single individual; however, ancillary letters may
be required to sue to gain possession. The regulations also permit
delivery of the property to a minor within the categories indicated."'
If the property has any significant monetary value, however, it is
believed that distribution should be made only to the guardian of the
minor with a receipt taken from the guardian.
If the summary court cannot find a person in the described cate-
gories, it is required by the regulations to convert the assets, with
certain exceptions, into cash by a public or private sale."7 Excepted
from sale are items valuable chiefly as keepsakes, such as medals,"'
watches, manuscripts and commercial paper."' The sale generally
cannot be held until thirty days have expired after the date of death
of the decedent, although it would seem that marketable perishables
could be sold before this time has elapsed in order to avoid a loss
through spoilage."' Prior to the sale, the summary court must make
a formal finding in writing as to the efforts made to find persons to
whom the property could be delivered in kind."' This finding is filed
with the inventory (DA Form 54). A complete record of the sale
with certified copies of the bills of sale is included in the summary
court report. The money derived from the sale is inventoried care-
fully on DA Form 54 and is transmitted with the inventory and
with currency and checks found among the effects of the deceased
"s.10 U.S.C. S 4712(d)(4) (1958).
1"432 C.F.R. § 511.6(a) (1) (1962).
".. The administrative construction of the statute has been that title is not affected by
delivery by the summary court or by tlse commanding officer. E.g., see 1912-40 Dig. Ops.
JAG 388, 210.8, Aug. 12, 1918. The problem was not considered by Colonel Winthrop since
distribution in 1895 was made to the personal representative of the decedent. Winthrop,
op. cit. supra note 121, at 763.
'"32 C.F.R. § 511.6(a)(b) (1962).
15732 C.F.R. § 511.4(k) (i) (1962). The statute appears to make this power discre-
tionary, but under the conditions stipulated in the regulations the effects must be sold. See
10 U.S.C. § 4712(e) (1958).
5'10 U.S.C. § 4712(e) (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 511.4(k)(i) (1962).
"..32 C.F.R. § 511.4(k)(iv)(2) (1962).
'" This point is not covered by the regulations, but a public or private sale of such
assets seems permissible in order to prevent certain loss. Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 121,
at 763.
"' 32 C.F.R. S 511.4(k) (ii) (1962). Effects having no market value or sentimental
value are destroyed by the summary court, and the fact of destruction is entered in his re-
port. 32 C.F.R. § 511.4(k) (iii) (1962).
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to the local disbursing officer. The local disbursing officer then receipts
for the funds on the inventory, returns the original and one copy to
the summary court, and deposits the funds in the applicable deposit
fund account. The appointing authority reviews the summary court
report and inventory. If the report is approved, the papers then are
forwarded with commercial paper and keepsakes to the Quarter-
master General. If an appropriate claimant appears after the sale but
before transmission of the effects, the summary court may deliver
the assets and the proceeds of sale to him."' If the proceeds of sale
have been deposited and the other assets forwarded to the Quarter-
master General, claims for the funds deposited may be filed with the
General Accounting Office; claims for the other effects may be filed
with the Soldiers' Home to which they will have been sent by the
Quartermaster General.'
The Soldiers' Home will deliver the assets to the "legal" repre-
sentative if he appears or to the "heirs." If no claim is made within
three years following the death of the decedent, the home sells all
effects except decorations, medals, and citations. The proceeds from
sale are placed in the Soldiers' Home permanent fund. A claim to
the proceeds in this fund must be filed in the General Accounting
Office within six years following the death of the decedent or other-
wise the claim will be barred."' The unsold medals, decorations, and
citations are disposed of as the commissioners of the home consider
in the public interest; there is no statutory provision barring a claim
for them by a personal representative.' Ancillary letters will not be
necessary to obtain the property from either the General Accounting
Office or the Soldiers' Home.
Although the summary court procedure presents a risk of ancillary
administration, it offers services of great potential value to the domi-
ciliary personal representative. However, the summary court is not
a fiduciary, even though standards of performance are exacted by the
officer's professional code and the commanding officer that are higher
than those required of fiduciaries in most states. Thus there exists no
direct fiduciary remedy against the court for the negligent handling of
an estate. If, in a rare case, a summary court negligently causes loss to
an estate, a personal action may lie against the officer serving in that
position. Losses caused by forging signatures on government checks
and similar misfeasance may be recovered under the appropriate
1624 Dig. Ops. JAG 401 (1954-55), Aug. 10, 1954.
16432 C.F.R. § 511.4(kiv) (2)-(3) (1962).
16410 U.S.C. § 4713(e) (1958).
'0' 10 U.S.C. § 4713 (c) (19 58).
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Treasury Regulations."' Similarly, a claim against the United States
may be settled on the theory that property has been lost by the
negligence of a government official as bailee.' An action also may
lie against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
negligence or misfeasance by the summary court, although the plain-
tiff would have to prove that the officer failed to use "due care," a
test distinguishable from that of the "ordinary prudent man man-
aging his own affairs" which is applied to determine fiduciary lia-
bility under state law. The lack of judicial authority upon these
points is a tribute to the diligence and care with which summary
courts have handled the assets of deceased servicemen.
3. Recovering Movable Personal Estate Not Under Military Control
Assets which do not pass into the custody of the commanding officer
or summary court, except back pay, allowances, and soldier's de-
posits with interest, may be recovered by the domiciliary personal
representative in the manner and subject to the limitations already
discussed. If, for example, the decedent left land adjacent to a mili-
tary post, the summary court would not collect the rents,"0 8 and in
most instances the domiciliary personal representative would not do
so unless the rent had fallen due prior to the deceased lessor's death.
In most states the rent falling due after the death of the lessor will
be payable to the heir or devisee until the personal representative
exercises a power to sell the land to pay debts, in which case, as pre-
viously indicated,"' ancillary letters may be necessary. 7'
A recovery of assets held by deceased military personnel in foreign
countries-such as the property left by the Colonel at Groningen,
Holland"'-will present substantially the same problems as the collec-
tion of foreign assets of deceased civilians, unless military authorities
can be persuaded to have the property recovered by the summary
court. There are some distinctions however. Agreements such as the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951.' are silent concerning
the administration of estates of deceased personnel of a sending state.
Many of the receiving states lack a system of administration of a
'631 C.F.R. 55 359.0-359.4 (1959).
1"732 C.F.R. 5 536.142(c)(2) (1962). To be settled by the Army, the claim must be
limited to $2,500. 32 C.F.R. § 536.29(d) (1962).
'a' See text accompanying note 108 supra.
'a' See text accompanying notes 61-76 supra.
70 See statutes in note 56, supra, some of which may be sufficiently broad to permit a
collection of rent by the personal representative. By the local law a personal representative
may be entitled to possession of the realty for the period of administration.
' See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent considered in this
Article.
"'North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951 [1953] 2 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
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decedent's assets as understood in Anglo-American law. But although
these agreements do not cover administration expressly, they contain
provisions which impinge upon administration. For torts or similar
offenses committed by the decedent not in the performance of his
official duties, the receiving state considers the claim and assesses
compensation to the plaintiff. The sending state then has an oppor-
tunity to offer an ex gratia payment. If this payment is accepted by
the claimant the case is closed, but if payment is not accepted the
courts of the receiving state have jurisdiction to entertain the action.1 '
Furthermore, the tax power of the receiving state is reserved in many
instances; e.g., over profitable enterprises of a member of the force of
a sending state.174 The authorities of a force of a sending state must
render all assistance within their power to ensure payment of duties,
taxes, and penalties owed by members of the force or their depen-
dents. 7 ' As previously noted,"' the obligations assumed by the send-
ing force under agreements of this type may induce a broad con-
struction of the term "local" in defining the permissible ambit of
activity of the summary court. The same policy to remove sources
of possible friction will be found even if the military decedent en-
joyed diplomatic immunity, as under the Agreement on the Status
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representa-
tives and International Staff,1 77 or under mutual defense assistance
pacts."'
The jurisdiction of the authorities of a military force in a foreign
country with the consent of the local sovereign to marshal and to
safeguard property of deceased members of the force has never been
questioned. The underlying principle, as expressed in Schooner Exch.
v. McFadden.7 and Schwartzfiger,s' is that the individual members
of the visiting or transiting force remain subject to the jurisdiction
of their own officers and to the laws of the country to which they
belong. This principle is so well established that only major points
of friction, such as criminal incidents and tortious injuries to persons
and property, have stimulated treaties and executive agreements deli-
neating the rights and obligations of the sending and receiving states.
1712 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, 1808, art. VIII(6), T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
1742 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, 1812, art. X(2), T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
1712 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, 1816, art. XIII(9), T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
'7 See e.g., note 132 supra.
177 Sept. 20, 29, 1951, Dec. 12, 1951 [1954] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1087, T.I.A.S. No.
2992.
17' E.g., Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany,
June 30, 1955 [1955] 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5999, 6001, art. VIII, T.I.A.S. No. 3443.
179 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
ISO Panama v. Schwartzfiger, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 405, 21 A.J.I.L.
182 (Panama Sup. Ct. of Justice 1925).
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If for some reason the military authorities refuse to exercise their
jurisdiction over assets of the decedent-as may well be the case with
the Colonel's property in Groningen 1 '-then either the personal rep-
resentative will have to collect the property or the collection will fall
to consular jurisdiction. The situation is exactly the same as if a
civilian had owned the property except that if consular control is
exercised, the usual consular fee is not charged for the property of
the military decedent.
If the domiciliary personal representative plans to collect the prop-
erty in foreign countries personally, he is favored by the fact that
most of these countries apply the theory of "universality of succes-
sion," which is based upon the Roman law. Usually there is no formal
administration of the estate in these countries. The heir or designee in
the will of the decedent succeeds to his assets and liabilities, and he
satisfies the claims of creditors without the costly judicial interven-
tion, formal publications, and accountings familiar in the United
States. Formal intervention, however, is possible. In Switzerland, for
example, an official liquidator, who is appointed and supervised by
cantonal officials, secures the assets to pay creditors if these creditors
anticipate nonpayment by the heir and if the heir refuses to give
security."2 In Holland, the heirs are permitted to accept the assets
under benefit of inventory by filing a statement with the clerk of
the Rechtbank. By this procedure the heir can avoid personal liability
for the debts of the decedent.'83 The usual pattern of liquidation is
for the heir to receive the assets and pay the debts without formalities.
At first glance this happily informal environment for collecting
foreign assets seems conducive to relatively economical marshalling
with broadening foreign travel for the personal representative, but
there are significant disturbing factors. These factors are diverse con-
flict of laws doctrines, local demands for public revenue, and cur-
rency controls. The domiciliary personal representative can collect
relatively valueless movables without difficulty, but trouble begins
when he attempts to collect bank deposits or valuables held in foreign
depositories.
In the United States there is a fair uniformity of views on con-
flicts rules governing the distribution of movables. The law applied
usually, but not always, is the law of decedent's domicile. Although
there is more confusion in the conflicts rules pertaining to adminis-
tration, the place of primary administration of movables ordinarily
281 See pp. 336-37 supra for the case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.
182 Nussbaum, American-Swiss Private International Law 31 (2d ed. 1958).
183 Kollewijn, American-Dutch Private International Law 58 (2d ed. 1961).
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is said to be where the movables are found." ' For land, the law of the
situs state controls devolution of title; and in those states in which
a personal representative controls land during administration, the
law of the situs also controls the administration of the land. There
is general agreement upon a test for domicile, although as indicated
previously8. the "full faith and credit" clause has been construed to
permit conflicting determinations of domicile of a decedent with
respect to property of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the
court.
In a foreign country in which the decedent leaves assets, "national-
ity" is the preferred basis for determining succession and such admin-
istrative controls over the liquidation of an estate as may exist. In
international law, diverse bases for nationality have been recognized,
and with some limitations each state determines nationality by its
own standards. 8 ' Mexico, for example, determines the applicable law
of succession by the nationality of the decedent; notwithstanding
the inconsistency found in the succession law of most states, Mexico
also determines the validity of wills and the law governing their con-
struction by the place of execution of the instrument." ' Brazil cur-
rently applies the law of domicile of the decedent in succession mat-
ters; but the law of Brazil controls succession with respect to the
claims of a surviving spouse and children who are Brazilian nationals,
if they receive more favorable treatment under Brazilian law than
under the law of the decedent's domicile."' Even if domicile is ac-
cepted as the standard or preferred test for succession or administra-
tion, the features recognized as significant in establishing domicile
may differ from those familiar in the United States. In Denmark
multiple domiciles are recognized by the same court, but changes of
domicile by operation of law, such as a woman's change of domicile
by marriage, are rejected."'
Foreign countries applying a universality theory also tend to
adhere to a unitary theory of succession or administration. Depending
upon the applicable conflicts rules, a unified administration should
exist. Furthermore, there is a tendency among these states to base
184 See Stimson, Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' Personal Property,
46 Va. L. Rev. 1345 (1960) (in which the writer suggests a general shift to tests based
upon the situs of property rather than upon the personal law of the decedent.)
... See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
18" As to the international effect of these unilateral determinations upon a claim for state
protection by a national, see Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] Int'l
L. Rep. 349, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
187 See Wren, Problems in Probating Foreign Wills and Using Foreign Personal Repre-
sentatives, 17 Sw. L.J. 55 (1963).
"' Garland, American-Brazilian Private International Law 44 (1959).
'89Philip, American-Danish Private International Law 18 (1957).
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their conflict of laws doctrines upon a personal theory of law and
to abandon distinctions based upon the physical location of the
property in question. Thus, Denmark, which uses a domicile test (a
personal theory of law), determines succession to land in Denmark
by the law of domicile of the decedent, with exceptions being made
for farm land and certain local restrictions."' There is, however, no
consistent tie between the unitary theory of succession or administra-
tion and the personal theories of law. Denmark has a subsidiary ad-
ministrative proceeding in which local creditors are satisfied before
the property is delivered to a foreign domiciliary personal repre-
sentative, although in that country a personal theory of law controls
succession.
An informal withdrawal of assets in foreign states after payment
of local creditors will tend to obviate an application of diverse con-
flict of laws doctrines, at least as to the movable estate. Although as
previously indicated such a withdrawal can be done without great
difficulty among states in the United States, currency controls in
foreign countries and controls applied by the United States to certain
foreign transactions limit the ambit of action of the domiciliary per-
sonal representative in making collections abroad. A detailed discus-
sion of currency controls is beyond the scope of this article."9 ' The
controls of immediate concern to the foreign personal representative
are developed in a licensing system over the operations of local banks.
Certain accounts or estates may be blocked and transactions con-
cerning them prohibited. Import and export of foreign currencies
may be regulated. Much administrative discretion in the application
of these controls is permitted, and a personal representative cannot
predict with certainty the strictness with which the regulations will
be applied. However, if a license is sought to export currency of the
decedent, a question likely will be raised as to the status and authority
of the personal representative, and such local law as there is concern-
ing his authority will be brought to bear. If a license is denied, the
money usually will be placed in a local blocked account until the
controls are lifted. Also the transactions may be prohibited in par-
ticular cases by federal law-either under the Trading With the
Enemy Act 9. or by special controls applied currently to Communist
China, North Korea, and North Viet Nam. " '
"I Id. at 43.
... The reader is referred to Nussbaum, Money in the Law, National and International
446-91 (1950), for a brief and readable account of these controls.




'See 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101 - 500.808 (1959).
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To collect the assets in Groningen, Holland,194 no local Dutch
administration will be required, but the personal representative will
have to pay all creditors and pay any taxes due before the property
is removed. To determine the situs for administration, Holland ap-
plies the law of the domicile of the decedent and adheres to a unitary
theory of administration when one is needed."' In estates of apprecia-
ble significance, a notary usually is retained to collect claims and to
pay debts and taxes. The retention of a notary may be desirable in
the case of the Colonel unless we can discover the precise extent of
his activities in Groningen.
An alternative and more desirable procedure in the case of a
serviceman-and usually in cases of deceased civilians also-is to
secure a consular curatorship of the assets. The Treaty of Friendship
and Commerce between the United States and the Netherlands...
does not mention consular administration of estates, and the Consular
Treaty Concerning Netherland's Colonies..7 appears to exclude con-
sular administrations. A consul, however, basing his action on custom,
should intervene to secure the assets of the decedent unless his claim
is excluded by the claim of a local official based on Dutch law.199
Although consular administrations were at one time covered in treaties
of friendship and commerce between the United States and foreign
countries, difficulties with state denials of the authority of consuls in
this area have led to omission of references to consular administra-
tion or curatorship in current treaties and agreements.199 Neverthe-
less, a claim based on custom can be asserted as effectively as one based
on treaty.
Under the United States consular regulations,' °° subject to the local
law and established custom, the consul takes possession of the personal
estate left by any citizen of the United States who dies within his
jurisdiction or who was residing therein at the time of his death,
unless the decedent leaves a legal representative in the country of
death or residence."' If a will is discovered naming a local personal
19 See pp. 336-37 supra for case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.
1"SKollewijn, op. cit. supra note 153, at 59.
9Dec. 5, 1957 [1957] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
197Treaty Regarding Consuls in the Colonies of the Netherlands, May 26, 1855, art.
XI, 10 Star. 1150 (1855), T.I.A.S. No. 253.
1II Hyde, International Law 1349 (2d ed. 1947).
See Coudert, Rights of Consular Officers to Letters of Administration Under Treaties
With Foreign Nations, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 181 (1913). The consular claim today is one
of curatorship abroad rather than appointment as a personal representative.
20'22 U.S.C. 55 1175-1179 (1958); 22 C.F.R. §§ 72.15 - 72.55 (1958).
201 22 C.F.R. 5 72.18 (1958). Legal representative means executor or administrator or
their agent by power of attorney, a child of legal age, a parent, the next of kin, or the




representative, the consul may take the necessary action to protect
the property until the representative qualifies; this procedure always
will be necessary if the will appoints a domiciliary personal repre-
sentative in the United States.0 2 If the personal representative or his
agent can appear promptly to receive the assets, the consul takes only
nominal possession and charges no fee therefor. But if the personal
representative or his agent is not present, the consul proceeds in a
manner similar to the military summary court except that the con-
sul's authority is broader and that a fee is charged in many cases."'
Movable personal property-including commercial paper, but ex-
cluding livestock and bulky items such as furniture usually found
in residences or places of storage- 4 is taken into the consul's posses-
sion and is inventoried. Tangible items not taken into possession are
safeguarded by placing the premises under seal or by placing the
property in storage at the expense of the estate. Bank accounts are
not recovered, but are reported to the legal representative with a
description of the procedure necessary to withdraw them.' The
consul sells perishables at auction, collects debts due the estate, and
pays creditors from money found among the personal effects or from
money obtained from the sale of perishables or from the collection of
debts due the decedent. If these funds are not sufficient, the consul
seeks funds from the personal representative. If funds cannot be
obtained from the personal representative, the consul sells at auction
that portion of the decedent's estate necessary to raise the funds
required.
The consul normally does not accept appointment as a personal
representative; but, if permitted by treaty and local law and if the
Secretary of State consents, he may do so.0"' The consul does not act as
attorney or agent for the estate and employs no counsel at the ex-
pense of the United States.0 ' The consul is responsible to the court
having probate jurisdiction over the estate in the United States and
to the parties in interest for the personal estate in his possession. He
must deliver this property to the appropriate legal representative
20222 C.F.R. § 72.22 (1958).
203 No fee is charged for Defense Department personnel (including servicemen), although
the dependents of Defense Department personnel are not included and a fee is charged for
handling their property. No fee is charged for handling property of coast guardsmen, foreign
service personnel, merchant seamen, or persons who die on the high seas. The fee is $2.00
per $100 in value, and the property is not released until the fee is paid. 22 C.F.R. §
72.52 (1958). The cost averages somewhat less than the cost of an ancillary administration
in the United States.
20422 C.F.R. 5 72.29(b) (1958).
20522 C.F.R. § 72.30 (1958).
20822 C.F.R. S 72.40 (1958).
20722 C.F.R. S 72.41 (1958).
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upon presentation of a clerk's certificate of testamentary letters or
of letters of administration. An affidavit by the next of kin must be
supported by the sworn statements of two persons.' If rival claim-
ants, such as a domiciliary personal representative and an ancillary
personal representative, seek the property, the consul will not de-
liver the property until the claimants reach an agreement or until a
judgment establishes a priority. If no agreement is reached or if no
judgment is rendered within one year, the consul will sell the personal
estate, including that part not originally taken into his possesion but
excluding jewelry, heirlooms, and articles of sentimental value. After
payment of debts and deduction of the consular fee, the consul for-
wards the remaining proceeds from sale with unsold property to the
Secretary of State for delivery to the General Accounting Office." 9
A similar sale will be conducted by the consul if the property is not
claimed within one year;21 the consul may elect a shorter period
within which to sell the estate if a claim not supported by sufficient
evidence is submitted."'
Certain property left outside the United States by citizens is not
subject to the consular curatorship. If a citizen dies while a passenger
on a vessel of United States registry on the high seas and there is no
legal representative aboard who can take custody, the master will
return the property to the shipping company in the United States.
The shipping company then will forward the property to the domi-
ciliary personal representative upon application. A similar death on
a vessel of foreign registry is treated as if the decedent died in a
foreign state, and, therefore, the consular curatorship may be initiated.
In some instances a consul may take custody of the property of
merchant seamen enlisted upon United States vessels, although he
lacks the authority to pay creditors of seamen as in cases of ordinary
citizens. If the seaman dies in a foreign port leaving property not
on board ship, the consul takes possession of it with a discretionary
power of sale.2"2 If the seaman dies leaving property on board, either
during a voyage before the vessel touches at a foreign port or while
the vessel is in port, the master is responsible for collecting and safe-
guarding the property, although the consul can demand the property
in his discretion.'13 This property likewise can be sold by the consul,
who returns quarterly the proceeds of sale and all other property of
...22 C.F.R. § 72.44 (1958).
09 22 C.F.R. § 72.46 (1958). Presumably the one year period means one year after the
death of decedent.
2'10 22 C.F.R. 5 72.48 (1958).
2" 22 C.F.R. 5 72.47 (1958).
11217 Stat. 272 (1872), 46 U.S.C. S 624 (1958); 22 C.F.R. §§ 85.4 - 85.9 (1958).
21 17 Stat. 271 (1872), 46 U.S.C. § 622 (1958).
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the seaman in his hands to the federal district court at the port from
which the vessel sails or in which the voyage terminates."21 If the
consul does not demand the property from the master, or if the sea-
man dies during a voyage in which the vessel is proceeding at once to
a port in the United States, the master delivers the property within
forty-eight hours after his arrival to the Coast Guard official serving
as shipping commissioner; this official in turn delivers it to the
federal district court.
The federal district court is required to deliver property exceeding
300 dollars in value to the legal personal representative of the de-
ceased. This person presumably is the domiciliary personal repre-
sentative. If the property has a value of 300 dollars or less, the court
has discretion to deliver the property to the widow or children, to
the person entitled thereto by the will of the decedent, to the next
of kin, or to a person entitled to obtain probate or to take out letters
of administration. The court can require probate or letters of admin-
istration in its discretion."'
If the Army summary court cannot be persuaded to collect the
Colonel's assets in Groningen, Holland,1 ' the expense to the estate
will be minimized if the consular procedures are initiated for their
collection, for which a consular fee will not be charged. Judicial
officers approving fiduciary accounts in the United States tend to
raise no questions about consular inventories, collections, payments,
and charges, which are documented with greater care than in the
usual domestic administration. These judicial officers, on the other
hand, do question travel costs for the collection of assets abroad
unless there is some very significant quid pro quo in saving to the
estate. In view of the uncertainties in foreign law which will con-
front a personal representative if he seeks an informal collection of
assets, there is as much to be said for the consular curatorship as
there is to be said against the waste and uselessness of the usual
domestic ancillary administration. In any event valuable information
can be obtained from the consul if the personal representative decides
to attempt the collection in person.
4. Recovering the Back Pay of a Military Decedent The major areas
of trouble now existing in the collection of a military decedent's
estate, and also in the collection of the estates of many civilian gov-
ernment employees as well, develop in the handling of back pay,
allowances, soldiers' deposits, and the similar accrued claims. The
21417 Star. 272 (1872), 46 U.S.C. § 624 (1958); 22 C.F.R. 55 85.6, 85.9 (1958).
2146 U.S.C. 55-626-27 (1958).
21 See pp. 336-37 supra for case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.
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Death Gratuity217 is not part of the estate of the decedent and the
personal representative clearly is not entitled to it. Back pay and
allowances, on the other hand, may be the major assets left by the
decedent and ones which the personal representative logically might
expect to recover. Under the present federal law governing collec-
tion of these accounts, the personal representative stands fifth in the
order of payment; he is preceded by the beneficiary designated by the
decedent, the surviving spouse, the decedent's children and their
descendants (the descendants taking by representation), and the
decedent's father and mother (taking in equal parts). If there is no
personal representative, the money goes to the "person entitled under
the law of the domicile of the deceased member.".... Will a claim lie
against the United States by the personal representative of the
decedent if a payment is made in an improper order of precedence,
(for example, to the next of kin when the personal representative
was entitled)? After the payment has been made to the proper
person, can the personal representative recover the payment from the
payee for the benefit of the estate? Currently there is no clear answer
to either of these questions. Since there is no certain answer, the per-
sonal representative may have to sue to recover the assets from a payee
and this may entail ancillary letters.
In Keown v. United States"'. and in Howell v. United States,'" the
premise was that an action against the United States was not pre-
cluded under old 10 U.S.C. Section 868,"' the predecessor of current
10 U.S.C. Section 2771. Under 10 U.S.C. Section 868, a duly ap-
pointed legal representative of the estate was entitled to pay in
arrears before any survivors. In Keown,"' the General Accounting
Office paid the widow of a deceased serviceman against whom an
action of annulment had been pending at the time of the husband's
death. Notice had been received previously from the decedent's pros-
pective domiciliary executrix and sole legatee in Iowa that the will
of decedent would be probated and that no payment should be made
... 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-79 (1958). This is a lump sum payment of six month's basic
pay (plus special and incentive pay) to which the deceased serviceman was entitled at his
death. The amount is neither less than $800 nor more than $3,000. If none of the persons
designated in the statute survives the decedent, the benefit is not paid. See 32 C.F.R. 5
533.4(c) (1962).
21"10 U.S.C. § 2771(a) (1958).
21992 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Iowa 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1951).
220519 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
22 The development of former 10 U.S.C. 5 868, ch. 3914, § 1, 34 Stat. 750 (1906),
as amended, ch. 35, § 4, 60 Stat. 30 (1946), is discussed in Howell v. United States, 159
P. Supp. 597, 599-600 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The parallel provision for the Navy and Marine
Corps was former 34 U.S.C. § 941a, ch. 35, § 1, 60 Stat. 30 (1946), as amended, ch. 393,
5 18, 63 Stat. 560 (1949). These sections were superseded by the present law, 10 U.S.C.
2771 (1958).
222 92 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Iowa 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1951).
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until the executrix qualified. The court held that the General Ac-
counting Office had an absolute right to make payment to a survivor
in the order of statutory preference until a demand was made by a
"duly appointed" legal representative of the estate. In Howell, 23 on
the other hand, the Court of Claims rejected this broad interpreta-
tion of the authority of the General Accounting Office and held that
a step-mother of the decedent, named as executrix and sole legatee in
his will, could recover the arrears from the United States after she
had given notice of her intention to apply for letters in Florida. The
General Accounting Office was held to be under a duty to give the
prospective executrix a reasonable opportunity to qualify before
payment was made.
The precise problem in Keown and Howell is not likely to recur
except with respect to claims for settlement of accounts of deceased
servicemen who died before January 1, 1956. Concerning these claims,
the language "duly appointed" has been dropped, and the demand has
been described as that of the "legal representative."2 "4 This provision
may be construed to cover a demand by the executor of an unpro-
bated but apparently valid will; however, the administrator of an
intestate estate would be expected to produce his order of appoint-
ment. The current law,22 as amended in 1958, permits payment to
survivors before payment to the personal representative. Further-
more, subsection (d) of the current law states: "A payment under
this section bars recovery by any other person of the amount paid.""2
This probably will be construed as barring claims only against
the United States by adopting the "facility of payment" theory
of Keown12' and rejecting the "reasonable delay" philosophy of
Howell.25 Such a construction will be convenient for the military
services and for the Department of the Treasury which now makes
the payments subject to the regulations of the Comptroller General.2 9
If claims are barred against the United States under the current law
after a payment has been made, in theory the personal representative
is left to his remedies against the distributee to recover the payment.
In Howell, for example, an action was instituted in the Maryland
223 159 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
22472 Stat. 1563 (1958), amending 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958).
22510 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958).
221 0 U.S.C. § 2771 (d) (1958).
2 2 7 Keown v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 191 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.
1951). See text accompanying note 222 supra.228Howell v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See text accompanying
note 223 supra.22974 Stat. 473 (1960), amending 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958); 4 C.F.R. § 34.3 (a) (1)
(1961). If doubt exists as to the validity of the claim or the persons entitled to payment
or if the claim involves uncurrent checks, the claim is still settled by the General Account-
ing Ofice. 4 C.F.R. § 34.3(b) (1961).
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state court against the payee, with oral arguments postponed until
the decision of the Court of Claims could be rendered.' The Circuit
Court of Appeals, in affirming the District Court in Keown, stated
broadly that Congress intended in 10 U.S.C. Section 868231 to dis-
pense with state administrations of arrears in pay unless the "duly
appointed" personal representative made demand before payment to
the General Accounting Office.Y On the other hand, the Court of
Claims in Howell placed primary emphasis upon the priority of the
personal representative to demand payment as excluding an infer-
ence that Congress intended to supersede state administrative pro-
cesses except perhaps in cases of intestacy. 3
If a court finds an intent by Congress to supersede the state law
concerning administration of estates, a constitutional problem is
presented which probably will be resolved in favor of the federal
power. No state courts have considered current 10 U.S.C. Section
2771'34 concerning payments of arrears. The state courts which con-
sidered the predecessor statutes" construed the intent of Congress not
to supersede the state law.' Recoveries from the persons to whom
payment was made by the federal authorities were permitted. In
Ashton v. Ashton, "' however, 5 U.S.C. Section 61 (f)"2 -applicable
to civilian employees of the United States rather than to military
personnel, but in all material respects similar to 10 U.S.C. Section
27712 '--was held to supersede the statute of distribution of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The decedent failed to designate a beneficiary to
whom his arrears in pay were to be delivered. Payment was made to
the widow. The administrator of the estate contended that the
widow did not become owner of the property by virtue of the pay-
ment and argued that Congress could not have intended to nullify
the law of descent and distribution of the District of Columbia. In
answer to this argument, the court stated:'
[O]ne who accepts Federal employment accepts all the terms and
230Howell v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 597, 599 n. 3 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
231 Ch. 3914, § 1, 34 Stat. 750 (1906), as amended, ch. 35, § 4, 60 Stat. 30 (1946).
232 Keown v. United States, 191 F.2d 438, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1951).
*m'Howell v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 597, 600-01 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
"4 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958).
'"Former 10 U.S.C. § 868, ch. 3914, § 1, 34 Stat. 750 (1906), as amended, ch. 35,
5 4, 60 Stat. 30 (1946) (Army); former 34 U.S.C. S 941a, ch. 35, § 1, 60 Stat. 30
(1946), as amended, ch. 393, § 18, 63 Stat. 560 (1949) (Navy and Marine Corps). The
statutes were substantially identical.
236 In re Kevil's Estate, 98 Cal. App.2d 388, 220 P.2d 555 (1950); Scammon v. Scam-
mon, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 90 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio C.P. 1950); Campbell v. Oliphant, 185
Tenn. 415, 206 S.W.2d 406 (1947).
237 117 A.2d 459 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955).
23864 Star. 395 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 61(f) (1958).
2 910 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958).
240117 A.2d 459, 462.
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conditions fixed by Federal law with respect to his compensation, as,
for example, the law with respect to deductions from salary for Civil
Service Retirement purposes. In the present case the employee was
bound by the law which provided that at his death, unless he designated
otherwise, his unpaid compensation would be payable to and would be-
long absolutely to his widow. This was a part of his contract of em-
ployment and in no way limited his right to dispose of his estate either
by will or by the law of distribution. A somewhat similar question
arose in numerous cases involving United States Savings bonds which
permit the designation of one to whom they shall be payable on the
death of the owner. By the great weight of authority such designation
validly passes title on death of the owner and does not violate the local
law of wills or distribution of decedents' estates. 41
Although it is believed few state courts will be prepared to hold
that their local law is superseded by a contract between the United
States and its employee, it is still possible that a direct intent of the
Congress to supersede state law may be found in 10 U.S.C. Section
2771.4 Without a clear indication of this intent, the state law should
prevail. The tenth amendment of the United States Constitution will
prove to be no shield in this situation against an extension of federal
power.
The Colonel's back pay and allowances" thus will be paid to the
widow in New York rather than to the Virginia administrator. Pos-
sibly the widow might give up this money voluntarily, although
under the existing case law she may be entitled to retain it. If the
Virginia administrator has to sue in New York, he may do so with-
out ancillary letters. However, he must file an authenticated copy of
his Virginia letters of administration in the office of the clerk of the
court in which the action is brought; he also must file an affidavit
that decedent was not indebted to a resident of New York and that
more than six months have elapsed from the death of the decedent
without a petition for ancillary letters being filed in a New York
court.2 " Whether he will succeed in recovering the amount paid to
the widow is, as pointed out above, an open question.
B. Collecting The Assets Of Non-Military Personnel
Who Die In Federal Institutions
Military custody and control of assets of a decedent as described
previously in this article,' with "quasi-administration" by the sum-
241Citing Reynolds v. Reynolds, 325 Mass. 275, 90 N.E.2d 338 (1950).
24210 U.S.C. § 2771 (1958).
243 See pp. 336-37 supra for case of the hypothetical decedent discussed in this Article.
244N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 160 (Supp. 1963).
Us See text accompanying notes 106-65 supra.
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mary court, is limited to persons subject to military law." The
property of deceased civilian employees upon a military post is
secured by the commanding officer under whom the civilian was
serving and is delivered to the legal representative or next of kin.
Substantially the same problems in avoiding ancillary administration
are raised in this case as in the case in which the commanding officer
takes custody of the assets of a deceased serviceman. There is, how-
ever, no provision for action by a summary court. If the effects
cannot be delivered by the commanding officer to the legal repre-
sentative or next of kin, they will be forwarded with all available
information concerning the decedent to the judicial officer of the
local civil government having jurisdiction over estates of deceased
persons. ' In most instances the person designated to take custody of
the property will be the public administrator, and an ancillary ad-
ministration then is likely. Inventories and receipts for the property
delivered are retained at the military installation.
Decisions by the United States Supreme Court removing civilian
employees and dependents overseas from general court martial juris-
diction.. have curtailed the action which otherwise might be taken
by commanders abroad to avoid administrative complications and
expenses in the foreign state. Summary court procedures now do not
appear available to collect "local" debts and to pay "local" credi-
tors,29 although it is possible this action may be taken informally at
the risk of the commanding officer or perhaps may be done upon
instructions of the domiciliary personal representative. If the civilian
is an employee who is subject to the Missing Persons Act,"' his assets
may be collected, some of them sold if necessary, and the remaining
assets returned to the United States. 2 ' The Army Regulations have
not been changed to reflect the necessity of reliance upon the Missing
Persons Act for collecting the assets of deceased civilian employees
overseas. In any event, the Act does not cover the situation in which
a dependent of military personnel dies in a foreign country. The
assets of these persons pass under consular jurisdiction or are admin-
istered in accordance with local procedures in the foreign country,
unless the domiciliary personal representative or interested parties are
able to remove the assets informally.
10 U.S.C. § 4712(a) (1) (1958); 10 U.S.C. § 9712(a) (1) (1958).
24732 C.F.R. 5 511.5 (1962).
.48 Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagli-
ardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470 (1956).
"'See text accompanying notes 130-42 supra.
10 56 Stat. 143 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1001-15 (1958).
'5' 56 Stat. 146 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1012 (1958).
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Property left by decedents at installation of the Veterans' Admin-
istration,252 in hospitals operated by the United States Public Health
Service," 3 and in St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Colum-
bia 24 can be obtained by the domiciliary personal representative with
little hazard of ancillary administration. However, several problems
are presented in collecting this property that usually do not arise in
the collection of property left under military control. The property
involved often will be small in value-typically items retained for
sentiment-which will not stimulate petitions for ancillary admin-
istration. Nevertheless, a large number of cases are presented for
the number of persons involved, since patients in hospitals have a
higher mortality rate than the relatively healthy specimens in mili-
tary service.
Upon entrance to the hospital, the patient will be given an oppor-
tunity to deposit his valuables. This will tend to secure them from
pilferage and will simplify an inventory and accounting by the per-
sonal representative. If, however, the appropriate installation authori-
ties distribute the property to the next of kin rather than to the
personal representative, the personal representative may be forced
into action to recover the property. This action may become neces-
sary not because of the value of the property, but to allay jealousies
and to suppress conflicts among the next of kin of the decedent
which otherwise could impede an orderly administration of the
estate. The difficulty is that many officers who must approve the
accounts of personal representatives fail to appreciate this human
element in administration. They will tend to look with jaundiced
eyes upon any estate money expended to recover assets without
market value. In many cases the domiciliary personal representa-
tive must be alert to collect the property of these hospitalized dece-
dents not because he obtains items of significant value for the estate,
but simply to clear away or to avoid obstacles to his effective admin-
istration. He must do so inexpensively. If he is put to expense in his
collection, he must expect some pain when the time arrives for ap-
proval of his account.
The Regulations of the Veterans' Administration 2 are more favor-
able to the domiciliary personal representative than are the regula-
tions of the Armed Services. There is, however, no procedure com-
parable to the military summary court by which some debts are
...38 U.S.C. 5 201-02, 5204-05 (1958); 38 C.F.R. §§ 12-12.23 (1964).
25342 C.F.R. 5 35.41-35.52 (1960).
2434 Stat. 730 (1906), as amended, 24 U.S.C. 5 177 (1958); 42 C.F.R. § 303.1-303.9
(1960).
25 See note 252 supra.
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collected and some creditors paid. " ' Under certain circumstances an
inmate's property that is derived from compensation payments, auto-
matic or term insurance, or emergency officer's retirement pay or
pension will pass to the United States as trustee for the General Post
Fund. This happens if an inmate who leaves no spouse, heirs, or next
of kin entitled to such property dies intestate in a Veterans' Ad-
ministration hospital or domiciliary activity, or in any other institu-
tion while receiving care and treatment there from the Veterans'
Administration. The domiciliary personal representative cannot reach
these assets for state administration. Creditors present their claims
directly to the Veterans' Administration within one year after the
death of the decedent. There is no escheat to a state." 7
The domiciliary personal representative has priority to assets not
in this category. The veteran is permitted to designate the person
to whom he wishes the Veterans' Administration to deliver his prop-
erty in case of death. " The designee is notified by the manager of
the installation and may request the property within ninety days
following receipt of the notice. If the executor or administrator of
the estate notifies the manager of the installation in the meantime
that he desires the property and if he presents appropriate documen-
tary evidence of qualification or appointment, the property will be
delivered to him instead.259 If there is no designee and no notice of
qualification or appointment of a personal representative, the effects
other than money will be distributed to the next of kin in the
following order: (1) widow, (2) child, (3) grandchild, (4) mother,
(5) father, (6) grandmother, (7) grandfather, and (8) brother or
sister.2  If a class is entitled to delivery, a joint agent of the class
will receive the property. Money is released to the person or persons
entitled to distribution by the law of decedent's domicile. "1 In all
of these cases the title is not affected by delivery of the property,
and hence a recovery by the personal representative appears to be
possible.
If a person other than an admitted veteran dies at a Veterans'
Administration installation, the property will be inventoried and
released to the executor named in a decedent's valid will22 or to his
administrator. If there is no personal representative, the property
will be released to the person entitled by the statute of distribution
256 See text accompanying notes 130-39 supra.
257 38 C.F.R. S 12.19 (1964).
238 38 C.F.R. § 12.1 (1964).
25938 C.F.R. § 12.4(1) (1964).
260 38 C.F.R. S 12.5(a) (1964).
26'38 C.F.R. § 12J(b) (1964).
26238 C.F.R. § 12.16(b) (1964).
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in the decedent's domicile.' " Property unclaimed for ninety days is
sold, and the proceeds from sale are deposited to the account of the
General Post Fund from which it may be reclaimed within five
years by the personal representative. "
Property left by decedents in hospitals operated by the United
States Public Health Service is delivered to the domiciliary personal
representative by the officer in charge of the installation. The
personal representative files his claim upon a form prescribed by the
Surgeon General accompanied by a court certificate of qualification
or appointment. "' If the value of the property is 1,000 dollars or
less, and the officer in charge has neither notice nor other knowl-
edge of the appointment or qualification of a legal representative or
reason to believe that a legal representative will be appointed or
qualified, ten days after the sending of notices to possible claimants
the property will be delivered to persons in the following order: (1)
a designee in writing by the decedent, (2) the surviving spouse, (3)
the child or children in equal parts, (4) the parent or parents in
equal parts, and (5) any other person entitled to receive the prop-
erty under the law of domicile of the decedent.' If no claim to the
decedent's money is filed within 120 days, the money will be de-
posited in the Treasury in a trust fund account. If no claim to his
other personalty is made within six months, all, except postal savings
certificates and other evidences of indebtedness of the United States,
will be sold at public auction or by sealed bid to the highest bidder;
the proceeds from sale will be deposited in the Treasury trust fund
account. Claims for these funds are filed with the General Account-
ing Office. Claims for the postal savings certificates and for other
evidences of indebtedness are submitted to the issuing agency, to
which they are returned by the officer in charge of the installation.
Delivery of possession of property by the officer in charge does not
affect title."7
The major problem confronting a prospective domiciliary personal
representative of a decedent who dies in a hospital operated by the
United States Public Health Service is a probable delay in obtaining
notice of the decedent's death in time to forestall claims by the next
of kin. In the United States Marine Hospital at Staten Island, New
York, for example, large numbers of merchant seamen are hos-
26838 C.F.R. 5 12.16(c) (1964).
2438 C.F.R. 5 12.17(b) (1964).
26242 C.F.R. 5 35.44 (1960).
266 Ibid.
26742 C.F.R. 5 35.52 (1960).
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pitalized, and some may die with substantial funds but without a
known domicile or known relatives. This places a heavy burden upon
the officer in charge to develop this information, and delays in in-
forming members of the decedent's family may occur. " ' This prob-
lem is even more acute in a mental hospital, such as St. Elizabeth's
in the District of Columbia. The patient upon commitment may be
abandoned by his family. These patients seldom have substantial
funds on deposit, and in many instances the hospital officials lack
adequate information from which to determine the next of kin. If
a personal representative qualifies, he will receive funds left by the
decedent; 20 but if the personal representative is from a state and if
the payment would work hardship on any near relative of the de-
ceased, the Superintendent may require letters to be taken out in the
District of Columbia" If the amount involved is less than one
hundred dollars and if no personal representative has been appointed,
the decedent will be considered a domiciliary of the District of
Columbia and payment will be made directly to the next of kin as
determined by the local statute of distribution. 7' If a relative has
incurred special expense in the interest of the decedent and if the
amount due is less than one hundred dollars, payment may be made
directly to this relative rather than to the next of kin." '
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no invisible barrier to the collection of property without
ancillary administration by a domiciliary personal representative in
another state of the United States, unless this collection involves
recourse to the local courts. Moreover, statutes in many states and
in foreign countries now permit a foreign personal representative to
sue without local qualification. Furthermore, the foreign personal
representative must be alert to statutes which condition the method
by which he must collect the property. Both barriers to and facili-
ties for the collection of foreign assets have been built into federal
statutes and regulations pertaining to the disposition of decedents'
property passing under federal control. It is this expanding area
of federal influence which now bears examination by the domi-
268See 42 C.F.R. § 35.42-.43 (1960), which sets forth the procedures to be followed
to determine the domicile and kinsmen of the decedent.
26942 C.F.R. § 303.5, 303.8 (1960).
27042 C.F.R. 5 303.8 (1960).
27242 C.F.R. § 303.9 (1960).
27242 C.F.R. § 303.7 (1960).
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ciliary personal representative and which will become increasingly
significant as a condition to his plans for collecting assets in the
future. The policies found in these statutes and regulations today
are, to a degree, haphazard and inconsistent; but a thorough familiar-
ity with those which appear to impinge upon the administration of a
particular estate will go far toward avoiding unnecessary ancillary
administrations.
